Denialism and the Death Penalty by Condon, Jenny-Brooke
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 5 
2020 
Denialism and the Death Penalty 
Jenny-Brooke Condon 
Seton Hall Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, 
Judges Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jenny-Brooke Condon, Denialism and the Death Penalty, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397 (2020). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss5/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 












DENIALISM AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
JENNY-BROOKE CONDON* 
ABSTRACT 
The persistence of capital punishment as a constitutional form of 
punishment in the United States reflects deep denialism about the practice 
and the role of the courts in regulating it. Denialism allows judges to 
embrace empirically contested narratives about the death penalty within 
judicial decisions, to sanction execution methods that shield and distort the 
pain associated with state killing, and to ignore the documented influence 
of race on the death penalty’s administration. This Article draws upon the 
concept of denialism from the transitional justice context, a theory that 
explicates denial in responses to mass human rights violations and 
collective violence. It describes mechanisms of denial in judicial regulation 
of capital punishment and argues that conditions will not be ripe for judicial 
abolition of the death penalty until this denialism is better understood and 
confronted. I identify potential entry points for exposing and overcoming 
denialism in Eighth Amendment analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The death penalty’s ineffectiveness and irremediable unfairness will one 
day lead to its end1—or so the theory goes. That assumption animates many 
contemporary critiques of capital punishment.2 Notwithstanding the limited 
 
1. Many commentators portend that the end of capital punishment is on the horizon even while 
there is disagreement as to whether its end will be at the hands of the courts or the legislatures. See Paul 
J. Kaplan, American Exceptionalism and Racialized Inequality in American Capital Punishment, 31 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 149, 172 (2006) (positing that if “capital punishment is abolished, it will be by 
the Supreme Court”); David Cole, Justice Breyer v. the Death Penalty, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/justice-breyer-against-the-death-penalty [https://perma.c 
c/DPA5-PPJK] (noting that “the abolition of capital punishment is probably only a matter of time” and 
“[w]hether its end will come at the hands of the Supreme Court or the people remains to be seen”); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Why Jurors Are Rejecting the Death Penalty, SLATE (July 11, 2017, 2:31 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/why-jurors-are-rejecting-the-death-penalty.html [https://pe 
rma.cc/39NP-PSJ3] (stating that jurors’ increasing reticence to return death sentences signals to 
prosecutors that “[t]he death penalty’s time has come and gone”); David Von Drehle, The Death of the 
Death Penalty: Why the Era of Capital Punishment Is Ending, TIME (June 8, 2015), https://time.com/dea 
thpenalty/ [https://perma.cc/D7ZK-TUT4]. 
2. See Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440828 [https://perma.cc/Z62A-
APQM] (noting the Court’s increasing “willingness to consider well-controlled empirical studies” and 
expert predictions that it will “pivot away from the overtly moral debates of the twentieth century in 












audience receptive to such arguments at the current Supreme Court,3 critics 
continue to cite evidence of the death penalty’s race-based arbitrariness in 
death sentences, excessively long and expensive delays from sentence to 
execution, and the number of innocent persons convicted of capital crimes.4 
Important research continues to document the death penalty’s many flaws,5 
reinforcing the perception that the more information that is available about 
how the death penalty really functions in practice, the sooner capital 
punishment will be abolished.6 
This Article sounds a cautionary note to that prevailing account. It argues 
that America’s exceptional retention of capital punishment7 is not based 
 
penalty”); John J. Donohue, Empirical Analysis and the Fate of Capital Punishment, 11 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 104–06 (2016) (concluding that “empirical evaluation will be at the heart of the 
case” against the death penalty); see also Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien, Abijah Taylor & 
George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in 
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 525 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. 
Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014).  
3. Compare Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(relying upon research-based evidence to question the constitutionality of the death penalty separate 
from the methods used to carry it out), with Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123, 1134 (2019) 
(stating that “[u]nder our Constitution, the question of capital punishment belongs to the people and their 
representatives, not the courts, to resolve,” and “the judiciary bears no license to end a debate reserved 
for the people and their representatives”). 
4. Legal scholars Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted that morally-based arguments against the 
death penalty have largely disappeared from discourse about capital punishment in favor of pragmatic 
ones. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 245 (2016). They note the prevalence of cost-benefit analyses and arguments that 
the death penalty’s problems in administration cannot be fixed. Id. Steiker and Steiker remain skeptical, 
however, about the success of a constitutional challenge to the death penalty based upon its arbitrariness 
and discriminatory application. Id. at 274. They note that the Court has typically avoided decision 
making based upon empirical evidence, conscious of its limited “institutional competence.” Id. at 274. 
5. See infra note 22. 
6. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reiterating that 
greater knowledge of the death penalty’s flaws would cause the public to deem it “shocking, unjust, and 
unacceptable”); Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (“[T]here is no question that the 
arc of the death penalty’s future will turn on the quality and availability of the empirical data.”); Bryan 
Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and Capital Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE 
DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 76, 77 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul 
G. Cassell eds., 2004) (“I have come to believe that whatever one’s views of the death penalty in the 
abstract, reasonable people of goodwill, if armed with the facts about how the death penalty is actually 
administered in this country, ought to conclude that the death penalty should be abolished.”).  
7. America’s retention of capital punishment is unique when compared to other democracies. 
See AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2016, at 11 (Apr. 11, 2017) (noting that for 
the eigth consecutive year, the United States was the only country in the Americas and the only 
democracy in the West to execute someone). Commentators have cited sociological, historical, cultural, 
and political factors to explain the death penalty’s persistence in the United States when so many other 
countries have moved away from capital punishment. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 66 (2003); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH 
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 
(2003); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION 12 (2010). Which of these drivers, or combination of them, best explains America’s retention 
of the death penalty remains debatable. 











upon ignorance of the death penalty’s worst problems; it is sustained 
through choices that ignore those problems in the face of overwhelming 
evidence. As explained below, denialism captures a complex set of factors 
that defines judicial regulation of the death penalty as a constitutional form 
of punishment in the United States. This includes the Court’s embrace of 
dominant, yet empirically contested, narratives about the death penalty 
within judicial decisions,8 its sanctioning of execution methods that shield 
and distort the pain associated with state killing,9 and its decision to ignore 
the documented influence of race upon the death penalty’s administration.10 
This Article conceptualizes and begins to troubleshoot the denialism that 
characterizes judicial regulation of the American death penalty, which it 
pinpoints as a formidable and under-appreciated barrier to judicial 
abolition.11  
Empirical arguments against the death penalty have long dominated 
strategies to invalidate it.12 During the 1960s and 70s, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (“NAACP-LDF” or “LDF”) methodically litigated 
challenges to capital punishment based upon statistical evidence of racial 
disparities in death sentencing.13 LDF teamed up with a social scientist to 
first show racial disparities in sentencing for rape.14 Its empirically-focused 
strategy culminated in Furman v. Georgia,15 the Court’s 1972 decision 
holding that the death penalty could not, in the cases before it, be fairly 
administered without arbitrary results. The decision effectively invalidated 
the death penalty, but LDF’s victory was short-lived: four years later, the 
 
8. One example is the notion that the death penalty is reserved for the “worst of the worst.” See 
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting how the Court “sought to make the 
application of the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its use to those whom Justice Souter called 
‘the worst of the worst’” (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting))).  
9. As Judge Alex Kozinski, former chief judge of the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
acknowledged in a news interview before his retirement, execution drugs serve as “a mask.” Von Drehle, 
supra note 1 (quoting Patt Morrison, Opinion, Column: Judge Alex Kozinski on Bringing Back Firing 
Squads: No, I Wasn’t Kidding, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2014, 5:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
op-ed/la-oe-0731-morrison-kozinski-20140729-column.html [https://perma.cc/4QCK-CKAQ]). He 
noted that America’s approach to killing “[o]f course . . . raise[s] the question of whether we are really 
comfortable with having a death penalty that literally sheds blood.” Id.  
10. See infra Part III.A. 
11. To be sure, one might resist my diagnosis of denial and characterize the barriers to judicial 
abolition as value-laden, driven by the justices’ political orientation, or their deference to parochial 
political consensus. While such explanations have undeniable weight, see infra Part II.C’s discussion of 
cultural cognition bias, they fail to fully explain the Court’s avoidance of uncomfortable facts about the 
death penalty. Denialism provides an additional lens to assess these features. 
12. Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (noting that “[e]mpirical data has always 
been relevant to the constitutionality of the death penalty”). 
13. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 53.  
14. Id. at 52–53. 












Court reinstated capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia,16 after states 
enacted new capital statutes in response to Furman. 
Following this turnaround, many opponents retained their faith in the 
power of the empirical case against the death penalty. Scholars and 
advocates continued to use research-based evidence to question the fairness 
and utility of capital punishment. Justice Thurgood Marshall also famously 
contended that greater knowledge and understanding of capital 
punishment’s flaws would eventually lead to its repudiation.17 This 
argument, dubbed the Marshall Hypothesis,18 posited that average citizens 
would be shocked and reject capital punishment as unjust if they knew more 
about racial disparities in capital sentences and the number of innocent 
people wrongly convicted.19  
More than forty years later, in his 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross,20 
Justice Breyer similarly questioned the death penalty’s sustainability based 
upon empirical evidence. He concluded that the death penalty likely no 
longer serves any valid penological purposes that could withstand Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny and expressed interest in full briefing on “whether the 
death penalty violates the Constitution.”21  
Meanwhile, an extensive body of evidence continues to grow 
documenting the death penalty’s many problems, including its ongoing 
geography- and race-based arbitrariness.22 Researchers predict that the 
 
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
17. Justice Marshall opined in both his Furman concurrence and Gregg dissent that if the public 
better understood the death penalty in practice, more people would repudiate it as an arbitrary and unjust 
practice. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 314, 362–64 (Marshall, 
J., concurring).  
18. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOW. L.J. 525, 527 (2009); 
Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing 
the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171. 
19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring) (reasoning that the death penalty is 
“morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history”); Gregg, 428 U.S. 
at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American people know little about the death penalty, and . . . 
the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of [its] 
consequences and effects . . . .”). He cited the death penalty’s relative cost and ineffectiveness in 
achieving its penological goals, Furman, 408 U.S. at 314, 362–63 (Marshall, J., concurring), its 
discriminatory imposition based upon race, its disproportionate impact upon “the poor, the ignorant, and 
the underprivileged members of society,” id. at 364–66, and the likelihood that innocent defendants have 
been and will continue to be executed, id. at 365, 368.  
20. 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing evidence showing the 
death penalty’s unreliability, arbitrariness, and “unconscionably long delays” and the presence of 
“significantly more research-based evidence today” showing that death sentences are meted out to 
people who are either actually innocent or less culpable under the law). 
21. Id. at 2755.  
22. See, e.g., HOWARD W. ALLEN & JEROME M. CLUBB, RACE, CLASS, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 12 (2008) (“It is clear that over the long sweep of American history, racial and ethnic disparity 
in the use of the death penalty has been of substantial magnitude.”); Stevenson, supra note 6, at 86 
(noting that since 1987 when the Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), 
“evidence of racial bias in the capital punishment system has continued to mount,” including a 1990 











“death penalty’s future will turn on the quality and availability” of this 
data.23 
Judicial decision making that minimizes, disregards, and distorts the 
brutality, arbitrariness, and inequality that defines capital punishment in the 
United States, however, complicates the empirical case against the death 
penalty.24 This Article draws upon the literature assessing denial in the 
aftermath of collective violence and mass atrocity to conceptualize and 
describe these patterns as denialism.25 The point is not that two dissimilar 
contexts are neatly analgous. Rather, the project draws on understandings 
of denial in other contexts to spark further reflection and study on why 
constitutional regulation of the death penalty appears to habitually manifest 
elements of denial.26  
 
report by the United States General Accounting Office that concluded that “82 percent of the empirically 
valid studies on the subject show that the race of the victim has an impact on capital charging decisions 
or sentencing verdicts or both”); Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (noting that “dozens 
of studies have documented the impact of race in modern death sentencing decisions”); Steven F. Shatz 
& Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single 
County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2013) (noting that in spite of the Supreme Court’s 
message in McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279, that statistics showing racial disparities in the administration of 
the death penalty do not matter to its constitutionality, “in the twenty-five years since McCleskey, 
empirical studies of the death penalty have proliferated,” exposing disparities “based on race, gender, 
geography and other factors”). Recent contributions to this body of empirical evidence include a study 
showing that the geographic location of the crime is one of the most powerful indicators of whether or 
not a defendant will receive the death penalty. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing study addressing death penalty rate for Hartford, Connecticut); Lee Kovarsky, Muscle 
Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L.J. 259 (2016) (describing 
concentration of death sentences in specific local counties); Robert J. Smith, Essay, The Geography of 
the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 265–75 (2012) (addressing disparities in 
death sentencing from 2004 to 2009 at the county level). Researchers have also recently documented 
how race influences which condemned defendants the government actually executes. Phillips & 
Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 5). 
23. Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34). 
24. CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN, at xii (2005) (arguing that the “death penalty creates 
tensions and strains in our legal culture that are managed largely through a process of collective denial”). 
25. The theory seeks to explain the role of denial in the occurrence and aftermath of human rights 
violations, including the denial that such violations occurred. See STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: 
KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING (2001) (analyzing denial in multiple contexts of 
collective violence); FATMA MÜGE GÖÇEK, DENIAL OF VIOLENCE: OTTOMAN PAST, TURKISH PRESENT, 
AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE ARMENIANS 1789–2009, at 3 (2015) (studying Turkey’s 
denial of the Armenian genocide and the concept of denialism more broadly); see also Mark Osiel, The 
Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1844 (2005). 
Only a few scholars have questioned or identified the role of denialism in the domestic criminal justice 
system. See, e.g., Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, Dissent into Confusion: The Supreme Court, 
Denialism, and the False “Scientific” Controversy over Shaken Baby Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 
153, 153–54 (describing one form of denialism as “the rejection of scientifically sound information in 
favor of purported ‘truth’ claims that cannot be empirically supported” and arguing that in a 2011 
decision three members of the Supreme Court contributed their “authoritative voices” to one such “false 
scientific controversy” involving shaken baby syndrome); Aviva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: 
Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
401, 402 (2011) (arguing “that the psychological concept of denial goes a long way in explaining 
prosecutors’ conduct”). 












In Part I, I define the concept of denialism, drawing upon the literature 
addressing mass atrocity and collective violence. In Part II, I identify the 
need for a theory to capture a complex set of factors relevant to the 
persistence of the death penalty in spite of its overwhelming flaws. Part III 
identifies facets of denialism in our current system of capital punishment. I 
show that this includes willful blindness about capital punishment’s 
systemic failings, as well as denialism about the judiciary’s own place in 
the system of state killing.27 Though there are many, I focus on four areas 
where I argue that denialism infects judicial regulation of capital 
punishment: assessing the role of race, the fallacy of reserving this 
punishment for the worst-of-the-worst, the Supreme Court’s assessment of 
the cruelty of execution methods, and the more fundamental refusal to 
question the disconnect between a justice system that values human dignity 
and requires judges to closely regulate state killing. I identify some of the 
tools that fuel denialism including secrecy and state distortion. Ultimately, 
this Article identifies entry points in Eighth Amendment analysis where 
courts can better confront hard truths about the death penalty.  
I. INSIGHTS FROM DENIALISM 
A. The Meaning and Significance of Denial 
What does it mean to be in denial? Denial is a term with varied and 
complex meanings, including psychological, political, and popular 
understandings. We speak of people being in denial when they discount 
facts that make them uncomfortable or which do not conform to their 
preferred world view.28 Denialism is commonly used to describe the 
 
third course between the options of retention and abolition: it authorized the continued use of capital 
punishment, but sought to tame its arbitrary, discriminatory, and excessive applications through a 
growing set of constitutional doctrines”). 
27. Justice Kennedy in the 2008 case, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), appeared to 
recognize this odd tension. In that case, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death 
penalty in the case of child rape, he wrote: “When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden 
descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.” Id. at 420. 
Leading criminologists James Whitman and Frank Zimring have described how America’s system of 
capital punishment allows decision makers, including the Court, “to support capital punishment without 
participating in the morbid processes of execution.” Kaplan, supra note 1, at 150; see also WHITMAN, 
supra note 7; ZIMRING, supra note 7.   
28. See Mark Hertsgaard, Climate Denialism Is Literally Killing Us, NATION (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/climate-denialism-is-literally-killing-us/ [https://perma.cc/3 
669-QKZK]; Lee McIntyre, The Price of Denialism, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Nov. 7, 2015, 2:30 
PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/the-rules-of-denialism/ [https://perma.cc/9968-
PXBH] (“When we withhold belief because the evidence does not live up to the standards of science, 
we are skeptical. When we refuse to believe something, even in the face of what most others would take 
to be compelling evidence, we are engaging in denial.”); Truth or Denial: From Climate Change to the 











rejection of facts supported by science, as in the case of climate change, the 
safety of vaccines,29 and some governments’ denial of a link between HIV 
and AIDS.30  
Science skepticism may reflect its own version of conspiratorial thinking 
or cynical political strategies,31 but it also shares dynamics common in post-
conflict denialism too. Skepticism of science similarly grows out of 
cognitive bias32 and is often inextricably linked with politics surrounding 
racial injustice.33 The version of denial that inevitably emerges following 
episodes of mass atrocity and collective violence provides the most useful 
lens for assessing the mechanisms of denial evident in judicial regulation of 
the death penalty.34 For starters, this version of denialism prompts further 
 
Anti-Vaccine Movement, Is Denial on the Rise in America?, WASH. POST: BRANDSTUDIO, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/sf/brand-connect/bleecker-street/denial/ [https://perma.cc/66ZC-Z5FT]. 
29. See, e.g., MICHAEL SPECTER, DENIALISM: HOW IRRATIONAL THINKING HINDERS SCIENTIFIC 
PROGRESS, HARMS THE PLANET, AND THREATENS OUR LIVES 3 (2009) (criticizing individuals who 
question the harm caused by vaccines, believe organic foods are healthier, or take alternative medicines 
as discounting “reality in favor of a more comfortable lie”); Leila Barraza, Daniel G. Orenstein & Doug 
Campos-Outcalt, Denialism and Its Adverse Effect on Public Health, 53 JURIMETRICS 307 (2013).  
30. See Lisa Forman, Ensuring Reasonable Health: Health Rights, the Judiciary, and South 
African HIV/AIDS Policy, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 711, 717 (2005) (“Denialists assert that immune 
failure attributed to AIDS results instead from the toxicity of antiretroviral treatment (ARV), 
promiscuous, drug-abusive gay ‘lifestyles,’ and in Africa, from poverty-related malnutrition and 
illness.”); see also Nathaniel Bruhn, Comment, Litigating Against an Epidemic: HIV/AIDS and the 
Promise of Socioeconomic Rights in South Africa, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 188 (2011). Former South 
African President Mbeki’s AIDS denialism is most well-known, but similar official policies have 
occurred in Nigeria and Eritrea. See Daniel R. Mekonnen, Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing as a 
Challenge to Human Rights: A Case Study of Eritrea, 5 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 1, 22 (2010).  
31. See Martin McKee, Denialism: What Is It and How Should Scientists Respond?, 19 EUR. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 2 (2009). McKee states that denialism is a process that employs “some or all of five 
characteristic elements in a concerted way” including “the identification of conspiracies,” the “use of 
fake experts,” drawing selectively on research, the “creation of impossible expectations” regarding what 
research can deliver, and “misrepresentation and logical fallacies.” Id. at 2–3. 
32. See Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Scientific 
Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147 (2011); Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (noting that 
people tend “to conform their perceptions of risk and other [beliefs] to their cultural worldviews”). 
33. Salil D. Benegal, The Spillover of Race and Racial Attitudes into Public Opinion About 
Climate Change, 27 J. ENVTL. POL. 733, 733 (2018) (finding that “high levels of racial resentment are 
strongly correlated with reduced agreement with the scientific consensus on climate change”); Ibram X. 
Kendi, What the Believers Are Denying, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/arc 
hive/2019/01/what-deniers-climate-change-and-racism-share/579190/ (“The denial of climate change 
and the denial of racism rest on the same foundation: an attack on observable reality.”); see also Edwin 
Cameron, AIDS Denial in South Africa, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 415, 418 (2002) (Justice Edwin Cameron of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa stating that “[l]ike holocaust denialism, AIDS denial has 
a fundamental racial impulse: a racial suspicion, a racial anger, a racial fear, and a racial conspiracy”); 
Mandisa Mbali, AIDS Discourses and the South African State: Government Denialism and Post-
Apartheid AIDS Policy-Making, 54 TRANSFORMATION 104, 104 (2004) (describing how “the South 
African version of [AIDS] denialism espoused by Mbeki and other high profile government officials has 
been obsessed with colonial and late apartheid discourses of race, sexuality and disease in Africa”); see 
also Jessica C. Nelson, Glenn Adams & Phia S. Salter, The Marley Hypothesis: Denial of Racism 
Reflects Ignorance of History, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 213 (2012). 












reckoning with the ways slavery and racial subjugation have impacted the 
American criminal justice system. It forces hard questions about whether 
that history powerfully shapes the death penalty’s administration today. 
B. Denialism in the Aftermath of Atrocity 
Following history’s most egregious episodes of collective violence, 
states, perpetrators, and bystanders alike have invariably denied that 
violence and mass human rights violations occurred.35 This phenomenon 
has occurred on an individual and collective level.36 
For example, nearly twenty years after the atrocities committed during 
the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, many Serbian citizens denied that the 
Serbs perpetrated most of the mass violence following the breakup of 
Yugoslavia or were “unwilling to acknowledge what they know.”37 This 
sentiment was inconsistent with the publicly available evidence of Serb 
atrocities.38 As a human rights activist who helped survey Serbian attitudes 
regarding the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) put it, “[t]he question is whether you really don’t 
know or you refuse to know.”39  
A central purpose of transitional justice models, including truth and 
reconciliation commissions, is to counter denial’s inevitable emergence in 
 
not suggest that any model of accountability has been successful in achieving justice or eliminating 
denial. There is much debate about the best mechanisms for achieving justice and overcoming denial in 
post-conflict societies. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING 
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 5 (1998) (examining “the incompleteness and 
inescapable inadequacy of each possible response to collective atrocities” while still “join[ing] in the 
resistance to forgetting”).  
35. GÖÇEK, supra note 25. In her study of Turkey’s denial of the Armenian genocide, Göçek 
cites the emergence of denial in the aftermath of numerous episodes of collective violence including 
with respect to the genocide of Native People and enslavement of African Americans in the United 
States; massacres by Great Britain in India, Kenya, and other locations; France’s colonization and 
occupation of Algeria; Japan’s atrocities in Korea and China during World War II; and, unfortunately, 
many others, including Bosnia and Chechnya in modern periods. Id.; see also DEBORAH LIPSTADT, 
DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993); Marko 
Milanović, Establishing the Facts About Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to 
Persuade Target Audiences, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1321 (2016). 
36. Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the 
Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 7, 12 (1995). 
37. DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOC’Y, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF 
THE ICTY IN SERBIA 18 (2008), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/a0be82c5-aa8a-4bcd-9d23-
bcef4d94f93c/serbia_20080501.pdf [https://perma.cc/H63U-EB6G].  
38. Genevieve Parent, Genocide Denial: Perpetuating Victimization and the Cycle of Violence 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION, Oct. 2016, at 38, 39 (“A vast body 
of literature indicates that while the Serbs are not the only ones who committed crimes of war, they are 
the primary perpetrators of the 1990’s wars in ex-Yugoslavia, where the disproportionate suffering 
experienced by Bosniaks is indisputable.”). 
39. ORENTLICHER, supra note 37, at 19 (recounting comments by Vojin Dimitrijević of the 
Belgrade Center for Human Rights). 











the wake of mass human rights abuses.40 Denialism’s span across varied 
contexts and its distinct motivations, however, has complicated the 
development of “a social science theory of denial.”41 Nevertheless, scholars 
studying the holocaust, the Armenian genocide, military dictatorships in 
Latin America, the genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and 
other episodes of mass atrocities have long attempted to understand the 
significance and recurrence of denial.42  
Stanley Cohen provides the most comprehensive classification of 
denial.43 He posits that denial encompasses both unconscious defense 
mechanisms and conscious choice to reject or ignore threatening facts.44 
Although the line between the two—unwitting avoidance and purposeful 
evasion—is not always clear, Cohen identifies three possible versions of 
denial: literal, interpretative, and implicatory.45  
Literal denial involves refuting knowledge, evidence, or facts.46 Claims 
that a massacre never took place, despite the factual evidence to the 
contrary, fall within this category.47 Literal denial may reflect, according to 
Cohen, a range of psychological intentions. It may result from ignorance, 
the avoidance of facts that are too painful to bear, or purposeful distortion 
and lies.48 Perpetrators employ denial when they cannot come to terms with 
their responsibility for harm.49 Conversely, survivors rely upon denial for 
 
40. Many advocates of truth and reconciliation proceedings believe they provide a more effective 
means of countering denial than criminal processes. See, e.g., Antje du Bois-Pedain, Accountability 
Through Conditional Amnesty: The Case of South Africa, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 238, 260 (Francesca Lessa & 
Leigh A. Payne eds., 2012) (“[South Africa] succeeded in a fair and effective ascription of responsibility 
for politically motivated crimes, and it did so by breaking through the criminal law responsibility 
paradigm that can so easily ground denials of responsibility by anyone beyond the reach of this 
paradigm.”); Richard J. Goldstone, Peace Versus Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 421, 422 (2005–2006) (arguing 
that “justice as an aid to peace and reconciliation cannot be doubted” and noting that “court proceedings 
and truth and reconciliation commissions officially and credibly record fraught history and put an end 
to false denials”). 
41. GÖÇEK, supra note 25, at 3. But see Israel W. Charny, A Classification of Denials of the 
Holocaust and Other Genocides, in THE GENOCIDE STUDIES READER 518 (Samuel Totten & Paul R. 
Bartrop eds., 2009); COHEN, supra note 25, at 5–6. Both Charny and Cohen have endeavored to 
conceptualize denialism into a social science theory, mapping its common, yet variable features.  
42. MINOW, supra note 34 (emphasizing the need to confront history and contest denial in 
responding to collective violence and atrocities).  
43. Parent, supra note 38, at 40. Genocide scholar and psychologist Israel Charny has also 
classified denial into six broad groupings, though his categories are specific to genocide. Id. (citing 
Cohen and Charny’s classifications of denial as the most “comprehensive” to date among the many types 
identified in the literature). 
44. COHEN, supra note 25, at 6 (noting “grey areas between consciousness and unconsciousness” 
with respect to persons’ knowledge of atrocities and human suffering). 
45. Id. at 7. 
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id.  












protection. Indeed, “complex psychic mechanisms” allow one “to ‘forget’ 
unpleasant, threatening, or terrible information” producing “a personal 
amnesia.”50 Cohen’s account tracks with psychological descriptions of 
denial as an unconscious “defense mechanism” that permits one to maintain 
a “favorable view of self.”51 
Interpretative denial functions differently. A person may acknowledge 
that an event or crime took place, but attribute it a different meaning.52 For 
example, a person might admit the deaths of a large number of people, but 
disclaim that the killings were perpetrated with genocidal intent.53 
According to Cohen, this can arise out of a genuine inability to understand 
the meaning of facts or can be a strategic effort to avoid justice or 
ostracization.54  
Cohen’s final category—implicatory denial—describes the 
minimization of events and attempts to exempt oneself from responsibility 
for harm.55 In this category, a person may justify their failure to intervene 
or argue that worse harms have been inflicted upon victims in other 
settings.56 This can operate as bad faith—a false denial designed to prevent 
justice-related responsibility57 that is familiar to any criminal justice 
system.58 But even for individuals engaged in implicatory denial, denialism 
may be less a deliberate strategy of self-preservation and more a form of 
self-delusion.59 An inability to release deeply held beliefs, biases, or 
grievances can cloud perpetrators’ beliefs about personal responsibility or 
the justness of their acts.60  
 
50. Id. at 12–13. We filter out disturbing “[m]emories of what we have done or what has been 
done to us, what we have seen or been told about.” Id. at 12. 
51. Roy F. Baumeister, Karen Dale & Kristin L. Sommer, Freudian Defense Mechanisms and 
Empirical Findings in Modern Social Psychology: Reaction Formation, Projection, Displacement, 
Undoing, Isolation, Sublimation, and Denial, 66 J. PERSONALITY 1081, 1084 (1998). The authors note: 
“Purely conscious maneuvers are not generally considered full-fledged defense mechanisms. Like self-
deception generally, defense mechanisms must involve some motivated strategy that is not consciously 
recognized, resulting in a desirable conclusion or favorable view of self that is conscious.” Id.  





57. Id. at 47. 
58. See Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of 
Neutralization Research?, 32 CRIME & JUST. 221, 231–32 (2005). Maruna and Copes describe the 
tendency of offenders to “define the situation in a way that relieves them of responsibility for their 
actions[;] then they can mitigate both social disapproval and a personal sense of failure.” Id. They note 
that claiming that actions were accidental or forced by circumstances they could not control enables 
perpetrators to see “themselves as victims of circumstance or as products of their environment.” Id. at 
232. 
59. Indeed, denialism spans a spectrum from unconscious to conscious self-delusion. See 
COHEN, supra note 25, at 6 (noting that for Sartre “denial is indeed conscious”); see also Milanović, 
supra note 35, at 1368 (describing denialism as “an exercise in persuasion”). 
60. COHEN, supra note 25, at 96–97 (describing multiple narratives and motivations that lead 











Although denial often involves cognitive, moral, and emotional 
dimensions, it is variable.61 It occurs at the personal, official, or cultural 
level; may be invoked by different actors, whether perpetrators, victims, or 
bystanders; and operates in different time frames.62 Denial not only shapes 
narratives during transitional justice periods as post-conflict societies 
reckon with recently experienced atrocity, it shapes historical memory and 
contemporary thinking about the past.63 As Göçek has emphasized in 
studying the Armenian genocide, it can define the thinking of societies and 
governments for generations.64  
For bystanders to mass atrocities—meaning members of the public who 
did not individually perpetrate crimes but either stayed quiet or enabled the 
harm—denial may serve as a salve against guilt.65 Those with personal 
connections to the events, such as having a family member who served in 
the armed services, are more likely to embrace denialism as a means of 
reconciling their proximity to what occurred.66 
The views and postures of local political leaders involved in the conflict, 
or those leading the efforts to recover from it, heavily influence denial 
during periods of transitional justice.67 For example, political leaders’ 
resistance to holding perpetrators accountable for atrocities committed in 
the former Yugoslavia reinforced denial among the public.68 The public 
 
perpetrators to blame victims and claim “justice is on [their] side”). 
61. Parent, supra note 38, at 40 (summarizing Cohen’s taxonomy of denial). Parent notes that 
Cohen believes denial entails “cognition (no acknowledgement of the facts), emotion (not feeling 
disturbed), morality (no recognition of responsibility or of immorality), and action (perpetuating the 
violence or not acting on known facts).” Id.  
62. Id. 
63. GÖÇEK, supra note 25, at 3. 
64. GÖÇEK, supra note 25, at 3; Cohen, supra note 36, at 13 (describing denial at the “collective 
level, what is sometimes called ‘social amnesia’—the mode of forgetting by which a whole society 
separates itself from its discreditable past record”). Cohen notes that this can occur at an “organized, 
official, and conscious level—the deliberate coverup, the rewriting of history—or through the type of 
cultural slippage that occurs when information disappears.” Id. 
65. MINOW, supra note 34, at 74 (noting that bystanders “often experience guilt because they 
avoided harm or else participated, through ignorance and denial, in the regimes producing collective 
violence”).  
66. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 37, at 18–19. 
67. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 37, at 19. The tension between forgetting and facing the past 
is felt most acutely by survivors of horrific violence. MINOW, supra note 34, at 66 (citing the view of 
therapists who work with survivors of torture that “[f]acing, rather than forgetting, the trauma is crucial 
if a victim hopes to avoid reproducing it in the form of emotional disturbances”). Minow notes that 
victims “who seek to forget ironically may assist the perpetrators by keeping silent about their 
crimes. . . . lock[ing] perpetrators and victims in the cruel pact of denial, literally and psychologically.” 
Id. at 16. 
68. See Vladimir Petrović, A Crack in the Wall of Denial: The Scorpions Video in and out of the 
Courtroom, in NARRATIVES OF JUSTICE IN AND OUT OF THE COURTROOM 89, 89 (Dubravka Zarkov & 
Marlies Glasius eds., 2014) (tying reluctance of leaders in successor states in the former Yugoslavia “to 
put to trial wrongdoers from their own ranks” with “the inability of the population to come to terms with 












continued to question the extent of atrocities that occurred, who committed 
them, and whether they were carried out with genocidal intention.69 
Although transparency and public acknowledgement are often cited as 
critical antidotes to denial, they are not cure-alls. At trial, perpetrators still 
deny facts, discount evidence, and refute responsibility.70 Even transitional 
justice approaches aimed at limiting denial71 are not always successful in 
holding perpetrators to account and certainly have not prevented mass 
human rights violations from occurring elsewhere.72  
As the summary above demonstrates, notwithstanding the permutations 
of denial in the aftermath of collective violence, denialism has common 
characteristics across time and place. The next section draws on the 
literature from these varied contexts and outlines characteristics of 
denialism that resonate with America’s failure to fully reckon with the 
atrocities that shaped the United States, and which may likewise be at work 
when courts deny systemic problems that plague the death penalty. 
C. The Function and Tools of Denial 
Invoking denialism as a lens for examining America’s constitutional 
retention of capital punishment does not equate judicially regulated state 
killing with the extralegal atrocities described in the previous section. More 
simply, insights from the literature addressing denial in the aftermath of 
collective violence provide a framework for assessing why denialism exists 
with respect to capital punishment and how it functions. 
The first, most basic function of denial is that it operates as a shield. It 
protects the person engaging in it from grappling with the consequences of 
acknowledging profound moral failings of humans as individuals and the 
collective failures of society. By shielding the person who engages in denial 
from acknowledging any complicity in acts or systems that have caused or 
continue to cause great harm, denial permits moral disengagement.73 That, 
 
69. Id. at 106. Petrović calls this “astonishing” given that “Srebrenica remains among the best-
documented atrocities ever and its perpetrators have been on trial at the [International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)] from 2001 onwards.” Id. But see Parent, supra note 38, at 44 (noting that 
denial in the region is “supported and reinforced by members of the international community from 
diverse spheres (political, academic, media, law)”). 
70. Genevieve Parent has noted that in Bosnia and Herzegovina “many of the facts regarding the 
killings are not denied per se but the interpretation is such that genocidal intent is effectively denied.” 
Parent, supra note 38, at 39. 
71. MINOW, supra note 34, at 88 (describing “overcom[ing] communal and official denial of the 
atrocity and gain[ing] public acknowledgement” as one of twelve aspirations for any societal response 
to collective violence). 
72. Petrović, supra note 68, at 90 (noting that the ICTY experience “added new insights into 
some old debates” regarding whether transitional justice or trials are the best mechanism to achieve 
justice). 
73. See Michael J. Osofsky et al., The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process, 











in turn, allows individuals to continue to avoid difficult questions about their 
own responsibility for—and perhaps proximity to—profound harm and 
injustice.74  
Second, denial provides separation. It permits a psychological clean 
slate, creating distance between trauma or injustice and the present. On a 
grand scale, this allows people to view current injustices and inequities as 
disconnected from the legacy of the past, absolving current actors of 
responsibility. In the context of legal decision making and legal process, it 
similarly permits individual actors to view their role in state killing as 
separate from the act of extinguishing human life. Their role remains noble 
and untainted, confined to applying the law, even those they may view as 
unjust.75  
Finally, denial serves as a mask. It hides and distorts the ugliness of 
incomprehensible harm, reinventing events. For this reason, in nearly all 
contexts, denialism thrives in the absence of transparency or 
acknowledgement of the facts. While facts alone may not overcome denial, 
testimony, evidence, and other forms of public acknowledgment contract 
the space in which denialism persists.76  
 
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 375–76 (2005) (“In most social systems that trade in death, . . . moral 
self-restraints are gradually weakened through participation in a progression of committing 
inhumanities . . . .”); Phyllis Goldfarb, Arriving Where We’ve Been: Death’s Indignity and the Eighth 
Amendment, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 386, 410 (2018) (arguing that challenges to execution methods 
“force us to confront the brutal material reality of how state employees use bureaucratic processes to kill 
other human beings”). Goldfarb has noted that the Supreme Court’s oral argument in the lethal injection 
case Glossip v. Gross was uncharacteristically fractious and clamorous. Id. at 413; see also Dahlia 
Lithwick, A Horrifying Day at Court, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2015, 5:48 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2015/04/glossip-v-gross-supreme-court-justices-argue-about-lethal-injection-abolition-burning 
-at-the-stake.html [https://perma.cc/X9WK-XR4S]. She contends that “the dissolution of decorum . . . 
may be related to the manner in which participating in a death penalty system—as Supreme Court 
justices surely do—requires moral disengagement that can undermine our better natures.” Goldfarb, 
supra, at 421 n.227. 
74. HANEY, supra note 24, at 155. Haney describes how the process of death sentencing works 
to distance and disengage people from the true nature of the task. Id. He notes that features of capital 
trials “facilitate death sentencing by diffusing responsibility, reducing or removing the moral tenor from 
much of the decision making, and minimizing the costs of a death sentence by failing to emphasize what 
such a verdict actually means.” Id.  
75. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) 
(discussing the role of judges who professed opposition to slavery, but nevertheless enforced fugitive 
slave laws, professing they were bound to respect the law). Cover notes that in decisions from this time 
the “judiciary paraded its helplessness before the law; lamented harsh results; intimated that in a more 
perfect world, or at the end of days, a better law would emerge, but almost uniformly, marched to the 
music.” Id. at 5–6. 












Denialism serves these functions through resort to a variety of tools, 
including euphemism,77 secrecy,78 and an exaggerated conception of role 
restraint.79 These tools help minimize harm as well as the denier’s 
responsibility for them.  
As explained in the sections that follow, the Court has employed many 
of these hallmarks of denialism and the tools that facilitate it when refusing 
to do something about racial disparities in capital sentencing. The Court has 
cited the legislature’s role in setting punishments and skepticsm of statiscial 
evidence to shield the Court from responsibility for reckoning with racial 
injustice. The idea that the Court is bound to enforce laws—even those that 
fuel inequality rejected by the Constitution—is a prototypical version of the 
separation provided by denial; it allows judges to minimize their role in the 
process of state killing and emphasize their inability to undermine the 
choices of the political process.80 The Court has also used empirically 
contested narratives that those executed are the “worst of the worst” to 
mask, hide, and distort a more troubling and less comfortable reality about 
who is executed and why. Judicially sanctioned secrecy also serves to render 
execution methods less perceptible, thereby masking the reality of state 
killing.81 Likewise, discussion of the death penalty, including within legal 
opinions, often depends upon euphemism or what Camus called “padded 
words.”82  
The next section traces the literature addressing capital punishment and 
its racialized history and argues that leading critiques of capital punishment 
 
77. See Parent, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing Serbian prime minister’s attempt to reinterpret 
meaning and memory by describing the Srebrenica massacre by using the word “crime” instead of 
genocide or massacre); COHEN, supra note 25, at 8 (describing how interpretative denial functions by 
attributing a different meaning to events and employing different language: so that it was not a massacre 
but “collateral damage”). 
78. See Petrović, supra note 68 (analyzing impact of public disclosure of video documenting 
executions on public perceptions of denial). 
79. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 8 (describing implicatory denial as minimization and 
disclaiming of responsibility: these killings have “nothing to do with me,” why should I intervene and 
risk “being victimized myself”); COVER, supra note 75, at 5–6 (describing a similar my-hands-are-tied 
approach when judges enforced slavery laws). 
80. Judges have long insisted that their role as neutral arbiters and deference to the political 
process limit their ability to do anything about problems in the administration of the death penalty. 
William W. Berry III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441 (2011) (discussing role 
of professed commitment to judicial restraint in Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens’s initial votes 
to uphold the death penalty, prior to each justice repudiating that position); COVER, supra note 75. 
81. See generally DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BEHIND THE CURTAIN: SECRECY AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-
reports/in-depth/behind-the-curtain-secrecy-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-united-states [https://perma.c 
c/6J9R-SKFJ]. 
82. See HANEY, supra note 24, at ix (quoting Albert Camus’s critique of the death penalty as 
“smothered under padded words” to prevent candid debate about what state execution “really is” and 
given “what it is, [whether] it is to be considered necessary” (quoting ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on 
the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 173 (1960))).  











recognize, albeit not explicitly, the role of denialism in sustaining capital 
punishment. I then apply the more explicit components and function of 
denialism outlined here to the constitutional regulation of the death penalty, 
examining how it serves to shield and separate legal decision makers from 
state killing, while employing techniques, whether deliberately or 
unwittingly, to distort the process. 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING DEATH PENALTY RETENTION IN THE FACE OF 
SYSTEMIC FLAWS 
A. Threads of Denial 
Scholars have gestured toward the historical, social, and psychological 
mechanisms of denial that tend to make the death penalty impervious to 
complete and durable abolition, notwithstanding its well-documented 
problems.83 But none have identified these features of death penalty 
retention as a separate force bearing upon the death penalty’s future.  
Commentators have considered arguments against the death penalty 
within two categories.84 One group of contingent criticisms includes 
concerns about its administration—for example, that the death penalty 
cannot be administered free of discrimination, and that it is rarely used and 
arbitrarily enforced.85 For these reasons, and other problems with its fairness 
in operation, contingent criticisms maintain that the death penalty cannot 
achieve its penological purposes, most significantly deterrence.86 The other 
group of anti-death-penalty arguments are moral—the notion that no matter 
how perfect and fair the state’s administration of the death penalty, and 
whether it serves its purported aims, state killing violates the dignity of the 
person, sacrifices the morality of the state and those who act on its behalf, 
and is simply wrong.87 The contingent and moral claims against the death 
penalty converge in that capital punishment is immoral if it cannot be 
administered free of racial and economic bias.88  
 
83. See infra notes 88–108. 
84. See Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1283, 1284–85 (2006) (characterizing prevailing critiques of the death penalty as falling into 
contingent or moral critiques). 
85. Id.  
86. Id. at 1285.  
87. Id. (describing the second group of opposition as “categorical” claims); see also Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that capital punishment was 
“uniquely degrading to human dignity”). 
88. Stevenson, supra note 6, at 96 (“Beyond the abstract debate itself, the racial and economic 













The discourse about capital punishment, however, lacks a theory with 
which to describe and understand an overlapping and arguably latent 
criticism of the death penalty relevant to all grounds of opposition: that 
constitutional regulation of the death penalty includes mechanisms that 
permit and even encourage courts to avoid honest engagement with its well-
documented flaws. This tendency to minimize or ignore the death penalty’s 
hard truths also keeps judges from candidly contemplating their own role in 
the flawed project of state killing.89  
Many leading critics of the death penalty have criticized these features 
of America’s exceptional retention of the death penalty, albeit without fully 
analyzing the role of denial in the death penalty’s constitutional 
preservation. For example, social psychologist Craig Haney, who has 
analyzed the fairness and effectiveness of death-sentencing, has criticized 
the Court for its “idealized” and inaccurate depiction of the system.90 He 
argues that the Court has maintained the death penalty “in part by denying 
the problems that still plague its administration”91 and excluding from its 
own view some of the most critical facts.92 
Haney’s critique focuses on the Court’s elision of research regarding the 
role of media bias and misinformation on juror impartiality, and the negative 
effects of death-qualifying jurors.93 He charges that this has created a 
“‘conspiracy of silence’ of sorts” whereby “broad-based social scientific 
analyses of how the system really works—including many of its systemic 
flaws, procedural imperfections, and sometimes irreparable 
consequences—have been excluded from consideration.”94 
Scholars Carol and Jordan Steiker have identified similar patterns in the 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, addressing how the Court has avoided 
historical evidence and empirical research related to the impact of race.95 
They note that the Court’s major decisions constitutionalizing the death 
penalty during the 1960s and 70s strangely avoid mentioning its “racially 
 
89. HANEY, supra note 24, at 142 (“Writing about judges who participate in the act of death 
sentencing, Robert Cover commented on the ‘special measure of . . . reluctance and abhorrence’ that 
they are required to overcome in order to do the ‘deed of capital punishment.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 (1986))).  
90. HANEY, supra note 24, at 6. Haney notes:  
The Court, in particular, has refused to consider, acknowledge, or be influenced by social 
research that describes a system that is too often plagued by error and tilted toward death. Many 
of the justices have refused to talk candidly in their opinions about the problems that undermine 
the fair administration of the death penalty. As a result, the language by which they describe 
the system of capital punishment has been robbed of much of its truth-telling power. 
Id. 
91. Id. at 7. 
92. Id. at 6. 
93. Id. at 6, 27, 115. 
94. Id. at 6.  
95. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 78–79.  











inflected history” even though the nation’s preeminent racial justice 
organization, the NAACP-LDF, led the charge against the death penalty, 
and the issue of race was central to its litigation strategy.96 
Even if capital punishment’s racialized history was not lost on the 
Justices entirely, the Steikers emphasize that the Court refused to address 
race openly when regulating capital punishment.97 This, they note, created 
a “false impression” that the death penalty’s most significant problems are 
discrete and isolated.98 The Court’s focus, for example, on juror death 
qualification, unitary trials, and standardless capital sentencing statutes, in 
the Steikers’ account, obscured the more monumental problem of race in 
the death penalty’s administration.99 The Court’s silence on this issue, the 
Steikers contend, has allowed “the unjust influence of race in the capital 
punishment process [to] continue[] unchecked.”100  
Bryan Stevenson has gone further, contending that most decision makers 
in the United States are indifferent to evidence of racial bias in the 
administration of capital punishment.101 He claims that America 
deliberately avoids honest engagement with the country’s history of slavery 
and racial apartheid, citing an unwillingness to “talk about our history” and 
to acknowledge how slavery and lynching are linked with capital 
punishment.102 Stevenson has contrasted America’s avoidance of its history 
with the experience of nations like Rwanda and South Africa that have 
confronted genocide and mass atrocities through truth and reconciliation 
commissions.103  
Austin Sarat has most explicitly described the legal system’s collective 
denial about the death penalty.104 He notes that technological adaptations in 
execution methods have masked the pain associated with state killing and 
have allowed the public to imagine it as painless.105 According to Sarat, this 
 
96. Id. at 79.  
97. Id. at 78–79. 
98. Id. at 109. In Courting Death, the Steikers explore the possible “strategic, institutional, 
ideological, and psychological” reasons for the Court’s avoidance. Id. at 98–108. 
99. Id. at 109. 
100. Id. at 109–10. 
101. Stevenson, supra note 6, at 92. 
102. Bryan Stevenson, We Need to Talk About an Injustice, TED TALK (Mar. 2012), https://www.t 
ed.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_about_an_injustice/details?language=en [https://perm 
a.cc/W9GL-7R66] [hereinafter We Need to Talk About An Injustice]; see also BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST 
MERCY 298–99 (2014). Although legal decision makers have avoided the legacy of lynching and slavery 
and its connection to the death penalty, numerous scholars have explored this connection. See infra note 
127. 
103. See We Need to Talk About an Injustice, supra note 102, at 9:51–10:08 (“We have a hard 
time talking about race, and I believe it’s because we are unwilling to commit ourselves to a process of 
truth and reconciliation.”).  
104. See AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
CONDITION (2001). 












is partly about shielding the public from gruesome executions, but also 
serves the additional purposes of displacing responsibility for state killing 
and avoiding “the difficult, often frustrating work of understanding what in 
our society breeds such heinous acts of violence.”106 Sarat notes that the 
law’s language further works “to veil the ugly realities of execution, 
separating cause and effect, and making it unclear who is actually ordering 
and doing the killing.”107 This diffuses responsibility for state killing and 
encourages denial of responsibility for the horrors of the system.108  
Justices of the Supreme Court have similarly recognized the law’s role 
in blurring the reality of, and responsibility for, state killing. When Justice 
Blackmun announced his opposition to capital punishment after many years 
of constitutional regulation of the death penalty, stating that he would no 
“longer . . . tinker with the machinery of death,” he did not simply voice 
disagreement with the Court’s jurisprudence.109 Instead, he called the 
Court’s insistence of constitutionality a “delusion.”110 More charitably, in 
his concurring opinion in a lethal injection case, Baze v. Rees, Justice 
Stevens described the decision by legislatures and the Court to retain the 
death penalty as “the product of habit and inattention rather than an 
acceptable deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of 
administering that penalty against its identifiable benefits.”111 
These critiques have begun to acknowledge a dormant feature of death 
penalty retention in the United States: courts’ unwillingness to openly 
acknowledge and respond to some of the death penalty’s most troubling and 
potentially irremediable defects along with the tendency to obfuscate and 
minimize the gravity of state killing.112 Scholars, however, have not yet 
 
106. Id. at 14, 64.  
107. Id. at 64.  
108. Id. (“[I]t has become too easy to believe that nobody in particular is responsible for capital 
punishment . . . .”). 
109. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
110. Id. Justice Blackmun stated:  
Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been 
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated 
simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me 
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death 
penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic question—does the system 
accurately and consistently determine which defendants “deserve” to die?—cannot be 
answered in the affirmative. 
Id. at 1145.  
111. 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
112. Sarat describes the search for “more invisible” forms of state killing as a means to 
“differentiate state killing from murder.” SARAT, supra note 104, at 65. He quotes an execution witness’s 
observation that the quest for so-called “humane” forms of execution “is not about sparing the 
condemned, but sparing ourselves.” Id. “We like to keep the whole awful business at arms length, to tell 
ourselves capital punishment is civilized.” Id. 











devoted sustained attention to diagnosing and understanding the reasons for 
these features of death penalty regulation nor offered prescriptives to 
confront this willful blindness. The concept of denialism provides an 
opportunity to build upon the scholarly critiques summarized above and 
examine whether these features of death penalty regulation present a 
separate hurdle to constitutional abolition of the death penalty.  
B. Deliberateness, Ignorance, or Denial 
But is the Court really in denial about capital punishment in the United 
States? One could plausibly claim that denialism is an inapt lens—or worse, 
an unfair charge—because the Court’s constitutional regulation of the death 
penalty has not avoided and denied empirical facts, but simply rejected the 
validity of empirical evidence.113 Or perhaps the Court is not yet collectively 
informed of empirical facts that undermine the death penalty’s reliability 
and fairness because such issues have not yet been fully presented to the 
Court.114 One could similarly contend that constitutional acceptance of the 
death penalty reflects a judicial conclusion that its merits as a punishment 
outweigh its problems,115 or it is simply an issue to be decided by the 
political process.116 Denialism as a systemic account of death penalty 
retention is also potentially problematic given that multiple impulses 
motivate individual legal actors.117  
These conceptual problems and possibilities, however, do not explain 
away scholars’ important insights described above identifying patterns of 
denial in the American death penalty. Moreover, denialism is a thought-
 
113. The decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), could be viewed as simply a 
rejection of McCleskey’s evidence of racial discrimination. For the reasons described in Part III.A., 
however, that is not a sufficient explanation given the Court’s acceptance of the Baldus study’s scientific 
validity.  
114. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s 
Glossip dissent practically challenged defense lawyers to bring a case to the Court testing his thesis, 
stating he would “ask for full briefing on . . . whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.” Id. 
115. Denialism may not accurately describe a justice’s belief that the death penalty on the whole 
can be administered fairly and justly. Berry, supra note 80, at 449. Berry notes that before reversing 
course and rejecting the validity of the death penalty or voicing regret for their decisions upholding it, 
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens “sought to apply the constitutionality of capital punishment not 
on ideological grounds but instead on pragmatic ones.” Id. For them this meant assessing whether capital 
punishment could “be applied even-handedly and if so, how the criminal justice system should be 
structured, including adding necessary safeguards, to insure that the process is equitable.” Id. 
116. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123, 1134 (2019) (stating that “[u]nder our 
Constitution, the question of capital punishment belongs to the people and their representatives, not the 
courts, to resolve,” and “the judiciary bears no license to end a debate reserved for the people and their 
representatives”). 
117. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 523, 530 (2016) (discussing the problems with treating a “collective legislature” as 













provoking frame for analyzing America’s retention of capital punishment 
even if it alone cannot explain the retention phenomenon. 
First, denialism powerfully surfaces how America’s history of collective 
violence and atrocity—genocide of native people, slavery, and centuries of 
violence against black citizens, including torture and lynching—is part of 
America’s unresolved past.118 The frame of denial generates much needed 
further inquiry into the legacy of this history with respect to contemporary 
institutions and systems, including the death penalty’s persistence as a 
constitutional form of punishment. 
To be sure, literal denial, to use Cohen’s taxonomy,119 has not, for the 
most part, marked discussion of native genocide, slavery, or Jim Crow in 
the United States; slavery is taught in our schools,120 is part of our 
acknowledged history, and is the subject of constitutional amendment.121 
Moreover, the Court’s awareness of the role of race in the criminal justice 
system, as Michael Klarman has contended, arguably helped bring about the 
Court’s criminal procedure revolution.122 Nevertheless, as some reactions to 
the recently published New York Times Magazine’s 1619 Project 
demonstrate,123 and the Court’s own unwillingness to honestly acknowledge 
the racialized history of the death penalty suggest,124 many in America, 
 
118. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatl 
antic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ (“To ignore the fact that one of 
the oldest republics in the world was erected on a foundation of white supremacy, to pretend that the 
problems of a dual society are the same as the problems of unregulated capitalism, is to cover the sin of 
national plunder with the sin of national lying.”); Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding 
Ideals Were False When They Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True., N.Y. 
TIMES MAG.: 1619 PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magaz 
ine/black-history-american-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/6FRH-FYZ3] (essay as part of project 
that “aims to reframe the country’s history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions 
of black Americans at the very center of our national narrative”). 
119. COHEN, supra note 25, at 7. 
120. Yet, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the importance placed on this history by most 
Americans and our country’s institutions. The Southern Poverty Law Center reported last year that most 
high-school students in the U.S. do not know that slavery led to the Civil War, that the original 
Constitution preserved slavery yet makes no explicit mention of it, and that the 13th Amendment was 
enacted to abolish slavery. See KATE SHUSTER, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., TEACHING HARD HISTORY 
(2018), https://www.splcenter.org/20180131/teaching-hard-history [https://perma.cc/D43L-VF7Z].  
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
122. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 48, 62 (2000). 
123. Adam Serwer, The Fight over the 1619 Project Is Not About the Facts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/historians-clash-1619-project/604093/ (“A 
dispute between a small group of scholars and the authors of The New York Times Magazine’s issue on 
slavery represents a fundamental disagreement over the trajectory of American society.”). Serwer 
observed that the critical reaction to the 1619 Project was more than a dispute about the interpretation 
of specific historical facts—dissenters took the greatest offense to the series’ pessimistic accounts of 
America’s progress toward racial justice. Id. 
124. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 78–79. 











including members of the Court, still contest the meaning and legacy of that 
history.125  
Like individual and societal responses to so many other instances of 
collective violence across the globe, denialism captures features of 
America’s insufficient reckoning with its history of slavery and racial 
subjugation.126 It helps describe society’s and legal actors’ unwillingness to 
engage with the racialized history of capital punishment and the history of 
genocide that is part of America’s undeniable heritage of state killing.127 
This includes many Americans’ unwillingness to acknowledge how their 
own lives have been shaped from this history and how power and privilege 
persist from it.128  
Second, denialism invites closer examination at a more granular level of 
how America’s unique path of constitutional regulation of the death 
penalty129 has been marked by self-conscious conflict, minimization of hard 
truths, and a resistance to empirical evidence of racial bias and other 
problems. Indeed, the Court has shown itself to be enormously conflicted 
about its role in overseeing the constitutionality of state killing. That is 
evident from the Court’s unusual reversal of course between Furman v. 
Georgia130 in 1972 and Gregg v. Georgia131 in 1976, when it professed faith 
in the power of state’s discretionary sentencing schemes that responded to 
Furman. It was evident again when the Court appeared to reverse course 
and expressed profound skepticism about empirical research regarding how 
the death penalty actually functions in Lockhart v. McCree,132 even though 
 
125. Justice Robert’s reasoning in a 2007 case involving a school district’s efforts to address racial 
segregation in residential housing that impacted diversity in schools noted that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).  
126. Coates, supra note 118. 
127. Phillips & Marceau note that “[t]he problem of racial disparity and discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty is so persistent as to be regarded as inextricable by many leading 
scholars.” Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4 n.20) (citing Susan A. Bandes, All 
Bathwater, No Baby: Expressive Theories of Punishment and the Death Penalty, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
905, 906 (2018) (describing issues of race are “at the heart” of the U.S. death penalty and its origins)); 
Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts “Legal Lynchings,” in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 17. 
128. Coates, supra note 118 (“America was built on the preferential treatment of white people—
395 years of it. . . . [But t]oday, progressives are loath to invoke white supremacy as an explanation for 
anything.”); Ibram X. Kendi, The Heartbeat of Racism Is Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/opinion/sunday/heartbeat-of-racism-denial.html [https://perma.c 
c/J9GK-TWN5] (“Where there is suffering from racist policies, there are denials that those policies are 
racist. The beat of denial sounds the same across time and space.”). 
129. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 39–40, 72.  
130. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
131. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
132. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). In Lockhart, the Court was presented with research showing that 
disqualifying jurors who oppose the death penalty, known as death-qualification, leads to a jury that is 
biased toward the prosecution. Rejecting that claim, Justice Burger reportedly bristled at the notion of 












Furman and Gregg helped construct “intricate rules and procedures” to 
govern the modern death penalty based upon empirical evidence.133  
Moreover, the number of justices who have endeavored to regulate the 
death penalty but then expressed regrets and repudiated their prior 
positions134 similarly shows ambivalence. Thus, the project of constitutional 
regulation of the death penalty remains tainted by recurrent judicial 
uncertainty about capital punishment’s sustainability and the Court’s role in 
state killing. This discomfort is mirrored in other aspects of the capital 
system.135  
No single explanation—deliberate design, ignorance of the death 
penalty’s problems, or denialism about judicially regulated state killing136—
is likely a sufficient account of America’s exceptional relationship with the 
death penalty. Some or all of these features may describe aspects of the 
system, and many explanations may be in tension with one another.137  
 Indeed, contemplating America’s capital punishment system as one 
sustained through denial may appear too forgiving. To say that our legal 
system is in denial when it reflects a systemic unwillingness to confront 
racial disparities in death sentences,138 or permits racial bias in jury selection 
in the absence of smoking gun evidence of impermissible motives,139 could 
 
1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 1672 (2018) (quoting EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: 
THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 189 (1998)). 
133. Phillips & Marceau, supra note 2 (manuscript at 30). 
134. Berry, supra note 80, at 449.  
135. HANEY, supra note 24, at 160–61 (describing “morally disengaging features of the capital 
trial process” and other “mechanisms of disengagement [that] serve to minimize the perceived personal 
responsibility and consequences of the legal violence in which the jurors are asked to participate”).  
136. These various approaches to the death penalty’s problems may resonate with other deeply 
rooted historical and cultural factors that drive death penalty retention. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 
7; ZIMRING, supra note 7. Criminologists James Whitman and Franklin Zimring have explained 
America’s exceptional retention of capital punishment as based on “deep, long-standing cultural 
differences between the United States and Western Europe that equate to very different understandings 
of the death penalty.” Kaplan, supra note 1, at 149. But others have questioned these cultural 
explanations for American exceptionalism, contending they discount “the issue of racism and inequality 
in the U.S. legal landscape.” Id. at 150. Paul Kaplan, for example, has contended that American 
“uniqueness has as much to do with its complex history of racialized inequality as with other long-
standing sociocultural forces.” Id. David Garland has also rejected cultural explanations for American 
exceptionalism, emphasizing the far greater influence of recent political forces, including the politics of 
crime control. David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 347 
(2005). 
137. Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97, 101 
(2002) (noting that the “the number of possible theories” for American exceptionalism “is large, and the 
provenance of such theories is broad”). 
138. See discussion of McCleskey v. Kemp, infra Part III. 
139. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (reversing conviction and death 
sentence of condemned prisoner Curtis Flowers). The Court concluded that the prosecutor engaged in a 
race-based peremptory strike of a juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but only 
after an all-white or nearly all-white jury tried and convicted Flowers in six different trials—all marked 
by prosecution errors. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. 2228. 











suggest that these results are the product of unconscious accidents. Of 
course, there are other much bleaker possibilities.  
The public and decision makers may accept the flawed and 
discriminatory system of capital punishment because the death penalty is 
primarily deployed against racial minorities and other marginalized 
members of society.140 In challenging the constitutionality of the death 
penalty as a racial justice matter during the 1960s and 1970s, LDF candidly 
raised that possibility.141  
LDF’s view stood in contrast to the more optimistic Marshall 
hypothesis,142 which posited that support for capital punishment depended 
upon the public’s ignorance of its unjust flaws, rather than antipathy or 
apathy toward the marginalized groups most often subjected to it.143 Given 
that Justice Marshall certainly shared LDF’s understanding of the death 
penalty’s racialized history and legacy, it might be tempting to view his 
theory as a normative vision of what should occur with greater public 
exposure of the death penalty’s flaws.144 But Justice Marshall appeared to 
have more than an aspirational vision in mind. Instead, he predicted that the 
public would actually turn against the death penalty if they knew more about 
it.145 
That view echoes what researchers have described as the “knowledge 
deficit” hypothesis—the notion that with greater knowledge people will 
 
140. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: 
An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2007) (criticizing the Court in 
McCleskey for focusing on whether racial discrimination in the death penalty was an “aberrational abuse 
of discretion or [an] unexplained discrepancy” when evidence of racial disparities showed the system 
was “working precisely the way it was designed”).  
141. See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 90. The organization claimed that the 
American public and their elected representatives tolerated the death penalty, notwithstanding its flaws, 
because the public and legislatures were aware “of its exclusive application against the outcasts of 
society, including racial minorities.” Id. at 91. 
142. See supra notes 17–19. 
143. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall’s 
prediction about the public’s reaction to more facts about the death penalty reflected an arguably 
generous view of what the public in 1972 already thought. In spite of public support for the death penalty 
reflected in public opinion polls and criminal statutes, he concluded that the death penalty was “morally 
unacceptable to the people of the United States.” See Steiker, supra note 18, at 527 (quoting Furman, 
408 U.S. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring)).  
144. Much attention has been directed to “testing” the Marshall hypothesis. See Steiker, supra 
note 18; Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 18. Acknowledging that research, Carol Steiker has noted that 
“Marshall’s conviction that death penalty attitudes would be responsive to certain kinds of information 
has turned out to find support in all kinds of places—from the laboratory, to the wider world, to the 
Supreme Court itself.” Steiker, supra note 18, at 553. 
145. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232–33 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall 
recognized, however, that the view of an informed citizenry is not the only one that matters and would 
have “no bearing whatsoever on the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is 
excessive.” Id. at 233. “An excessive penalty is invalid under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause,” he noted “‘even though popular sentiment may favor’ it.” Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 331 












care more about social and policy issues, particularly those informed by 
scientific research, and feel “higher degrees of personal efficacy and 
responsibility” with respect to policy problems.146 Not surprisingly, the 
knowledge deficit theory has fueled strategies in response to many public 
policy dilemmas, including climate change.147  
But as some researchers have found, a lack of information often does not 
reliably account for the public’s views on policy issues, even those 
susceptible to evidence-based research. Public opinion also does not often 
move in response to increased information and knowledge. Research has 
shown that, particularly in the context of policy debates informed by 
scientific data, the public is either impervious to greater knowledge and 
factual understanding or unswayed by greater knowledge.148  
Cultural cognition theory provides one explanation for this resistance. It 
posits that a set of psychological mechanisms render individuals likely to 
selectively “credit or dismiss evidence” in accordance with their values.149 
In other words, people’s beliefs are influenced more by their pre-existing 
values, which tend to be shaped by their experiences and cultural 
perspectives, rather than access to information.150 Thus, cultural cognition 
scholars attribute “political conflict over empirical policy questions” largely 
to parties’ different cultural perspectives.151 
Legal scholars have invoked cultural cognition theories in explaining 
how some of the “most fiercely contested policy disputes” including the 
death penalty and gun control resist resolution through empirical study.152 
 
146. Paul M. Kellstedt, Sammy Zahran & Arnold Vedlitz, Personal Efficacy, the Information 
Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States, 28 RISK 
ANALYSIS 113, 116 (2008). For example, applying the theory to climate change, social scientists 
explained the long-existing absence of “public outcry about global warming,”—which may be changing 
over time—as a knowledge-deficit problem. Id. at 114. Under this theory, a longstanding lack of public 
outcry was “not because the public does not care enough about global warming;” it was because the 
public did not “know enough about it.” Id. at 114, 116 (describing this conventional wisdom as 
“straightforward applications of the knowledge-deficit model to the issue of global warming”). 
147. For example, in the climate change context, the belief that greater public knowledge would 
lead to greater action and changes in behavior resulted in campaigns aimed at increasing public 
awareness and efforts to translate science into popular understanding. Id. 
148. Id. at 122. One group of researchers noted that “contrary to the assumptions underlying the 
knowledge-deficit model . . . the effects of information on both concern for global warming and 
responsibility for it are exactly the opposite of what were expected.” Id. Their study showed that greater 
information about global warming caused people to feel both less responsible for it and less concerned 
about it. Id.  
149. Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman, supra note 32, at 148.  
150. Kahan, supra note 32, at 23 (noting that people tend “to conform their perceptions of risk 
and other [beliefs] to their cultural worldviews”). 
151. David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1476 
(2014). 
152. Id. 











This is so even when questions like public safety or deterrence are capable 
of objective measurement.153  
Cultural cognition theory may have particular salience in understanding 
support for the death penalty including by the Court. Contrary to 
assumptions made by the Marshall hypothesis, research shows that factors 
other than knowledge about the death penalty—such as race, political 
affiliation, values, and personality characteristics—are influential in 
shaping the public’s views about the death penalty.154  
Others believe, however, that greater factual knowledge has, and will 
continue to, impact the public’s and judiciary’s views about the death 
penalty. Bryan Stevenson, for example, has contended that “media accounts 
of exonerations” and “reports about the unreliability” of capital punishment 
have started to shift both the “public’s and decision makers’ views about the 
death penalty.”155 Carol Steiker has noted that Justice Marshall’s theory 
seems to have had the greatest resonance with respect to the impact of 
increased knowledge on members of the Court.156 It is now a familiar pattern 
that individual jurists, after laboring for years to constitutionally regulate 
the death penalty, later give up on the idea of a constitutional death penalty 
and repudiate their prior positions, even in retirement.157 
Momentum toward abolition at the state level may similarly suggest that 
greater exposure of how the death penalty really works in practice and its 
persistent flaws is leading to its decline. Since 1976 when Gregg was 
decided, states have continued to abolish the death penalty.158 This has 
 
153. Id. 
154. See Steiker, supra note 18, at 533–34 (discussing burgeoning sociological literature on 
“cultural cognition” and noting studies showing “that factors beyond mere information—such as 
emotional or cultural commitments—are at work in the maintenance of support for capital punishment”). 
Steiker notes:  
Death penalty opinion researchers outside of the context of testing the Marshall hypothesis have 
found strong correlations between death penalty attitudes and attributes such as race and 
political affiliation, and personality characteristics such as emotionality, authoritarianism, and 
personal attributional style. The most recent attempt to study the Marshall hypothesis in an 
experimental setting finds evidence, consistent with these correlations, that death penalty 
attitudes are often “value-expressive” in the sense that they should be viewed as “an expression 
of underlying values rather than a more rational or instrumental assessment of policy.” 
Id. at 534 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Scott Vollum, Stacy Mallicoat & Jacqueline Buffington-Vollum, 
Death Penalty Attitudes in an Increasingly Critical Climate: Value-Expressive Support and Attitude 
Mutability, 5 S.W. J. CRIM. JUST. 221, 224 (2009)). 
155. Stevenson, supra note 6, at 78. 
156. Steiker, supra note 18, at 545–46 (“It is a delicious irony—and one that I suspect Justice 
Marshall himself would have savored—that the Marshall hypothesis has fared the best not in the 
laboratory, and not in the wider world, but rather on the Supreme Court itself.”). 
157. See Berry, supra note 80, at 442 (describing how Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens 
reversed course in their belief in the constitutionality of the death penalty, noting that “one by one, most 
recently in 2008, each concluded that capital punishment should be abolished after twenty years of 
deciding capital cases on the United States Supreme Court”). 












occurred legislatively and through the courts. Most recently, in 2018, the 
state’s highest court in Washington struck down the death penalty as 
unconstitutional—the fourth time in the history of the state’s use of capital 
punishment.159 In 2020, Colorado abolished the death penalty through 
legislation.160 Accordingly, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia 
now reject the death penalty, while twenty-eight retain it.161 In addition, 
governors of three states—Oregon, Pennsylvania, and California—have 
issued death penalty moratoriums pending study or revision of the states’ 
systems.162 Additionally, public campaigns to limit states’ access to 
execution drugs and decisions by drug manufacturers to prevent their 
products’ use in executions have thrown sand in the wheels of capital 
punishment.163  
These developments suggest that public acceptance of the death penalty 
is waning—a conclusion reinforced by public opinion polling.164 In 2017, a 
nationwide survey by Gallup suggested that Americans’ support for capital 
punishment is the lowest in forty-five years.165 Indeed, only 55 percent of 
Americans voice support for the death penalty in the case of murder, down 
from 60 percent only a year earlier.166  
This arguable abolition momentum, however, should not be overstated. 
Over half of the states still retain capital punishment, even though fewer 
actively carry out death sentences.167 Among the states that retain the death 
penalty, a subset account for the majority of executions and appear firmly 
committed to death penalty retention.168 Moreover, a majority of the 
 
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/XM2U-5ZP5] 
[hereinafter State by State]. 
159. State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018). The court emphasized that it was not finding 
the death penalty unconstitutional “per se” but that it was “invalid because it is imposed in an arbitrary 
and racially biased manner.” Id. at 626–27.  
160. Neil Vigdor, Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty and Commutes Sentences of Death Row 
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/colorado-death-penalty-
repeal.html [https://perma.cc/67YD-HASW]. 
161. State by State, supra note 158. 
162. Id. 
163. See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1344 (2014) 
(noting that “the dominance of lethal injection . . . imperiled all capital punishment when lethal injection 
faced legal challenges”). 
164. Ankur Desai & Brandon L. Garrett, The State of the Death Penalty, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1255, 1256 (2019) (“Death sentencing has fallen to a modern low and executions are increasingly rare.”). 
165. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Oct. 
26, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx [https://perma 
.cc/95LR-ASM2]; Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, Gallup Poll Social Series: Crime, GALLUP NEWS 
SERV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/GallupDeathPenaltyTopline17 
1026.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSE6-LYCU]. 
166. Jones & Saad, supra note 165. 
167. Desai & Garrett, supra note 164, at 1258. 
168. See Desai & Garrett, supra note 164, at 1262 (“The American death penalty has always been 
dominated by the practices of the most active death sentencing jurisdictions[;] . . . three states, California, 
Florida, and Texas, play an outsized role (and constitute a growing share) of death sentencing.”). 











Supreme Court appears unwilling to question the legality of the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding flaws in the system 
exposed through four decades of closer judicial scrutiny.169 
The reasons for the recent turn against the death penalty at the state level 
are not self-evident, but may suggest at least some evidence of a willingness 
within American society to acknowledge the death penalty’s worst 
features.170 This iterative progress toward death penalty abolition in some 
parts of the country does not fully explain the mechanisms that continue to 
drive death-penalty states’ retention of capital punishment or the 
commitment to judicial regulation of it as an accepted constitutional 
punishment.171 
 Moreover, the exorbitant financial cost of the death penalty has carried 
significant weight in the debates that have led states to reject capital 
punishment.172 On the one hand, this suggests that the public and legal 
decision makers have concluded that the death penalty is not worth it. Still, 
economically driven rejections of the death penalty do not necessarily tell 
us anything about the impact of empirically driven arguments regarding the 
death penalty’s utility or unjust administration. Thus, one cannot easily 
presume that abolition momentum, assuming one exists, vindicates the 
Marshall hypothesis and reflects public recognition of the death penalty’s 
irreconcilable flaws. 
Overall, greater information about the death penalty’s problems has not 
yet resulted in sweeping rejection of it by the public, and certainly not by 
 
California may be an exception to this group following Governor Gavin Newsom’s announcement in 
March 2019 that he was imposing a moratorium on executions in the state, which at the time had 737 
persons on death row, the largest in the nation. See Tim Arango, California Death Penalty Suspended; 
737 Inmates Get Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/ 
us/california-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/B8E6-C385]. 
169. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123, 1134 (2019) (emphasizing judicial 
deference to political process on death penalty retention). 
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
171. See Desai & Garrett, supra note 164, at 1256 (noting that empirical research has not yet fully 
analyzed the reasons for the death penalty’s decline). 
172. Studies across the country have found that states would each save millions of dollars through 
death penalty abolition because of the exorbitant costs associated with prosecuting such cases. RICHARD 
WILLIAMS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE COST OF PUNISHMENT (2011), https://w 
ww.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/the-cost-of-punishment.aspx [https://perma.cc/A947-V 
M9C] (noting that “recent legislative action abolishing the death penalty has been spurred by practical 
concerns” including, for example, New Jersey, which “abolished its death penalty in 2007 in large part 
because the state had spent $254 million over 21 years administering it without executing a single 
person”); see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Death and Taxes: The Real Cost of the Death Penalty, FORBES 
(Sept. 22, 2011, 11:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/09/22/death-and-taxes-
the-real-cost-of-the-death-penalty/#59bd6bef673e [https://perma.cc/P9GU-4T2C] (noting that 
arguments based upon race, justice, and ineffectiveness for years have “failed to sway a majority of 
Americans” against the death penalty “[b]ut now, something else may be turning the tide of public 












the Court.173 Even if Justice Marshall’s theory was partially prescient,174 it 
did not contemplate that with exposure of the death penalty’s worst features, 
members of the public and legal decision makers, including on the Court, 
would discount such data or simply deny its relevance to the legality of 
capital punishment.175  
The instinct that greater empirical data about the death penalty’s unjust 
flaws will eventually lead to its demise also does not account for the 
potential “legitimizing” effect of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
regulation of capital punishment.176 As the Steikers have noted, the long-
term project of judicial regulation of the death penalty arguably helps to 
normalize capital punishment, encasing it with a thicker shell of legitimacy 
that helps to insulate its defects from broader condemnation and repudiation 
perhaps even by the Court.177  
In the end, the reason for death penalty retention as a constitutional form 
of punishment is contested178 and explanations for its partial decline are still 
understudied.179 Denialism provides an additional lens through which to 
 
173. The Court has restricted the death penalty for certain categories of defendants for whom 
capital punishment’s asserted penological purposes are not served. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008) (barring execution for the crime of rape of a child when death did not, and was not intended 
to, result); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring the execution of children); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the execution of the intellectually disabled). But on the current 
Supreme Court, only Justice Breyer along with Justice Ginsburg, who joined his dissent in Glossip, has 
gone on the record suggesting the likely unconstitutionality of capital punishment in and of itself. See 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
174. See Steiker, supra note 18. 
175. See discussion of McCleskey, infra Part III.A.  
176. See generally STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4; Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and 
Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV. 760, 782 (2012) (reviewing GARLAND, supra note 7) (calling for 
greater analysis of “the legitimizing role of the Supreme Court’s constitutional imprimatur on capital 
punishment”); see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–9 (1999) (noting that “the Supreme Court validates the results of the 
criminal justice system as fair” given the theoretical provision of rights to defendants, but that such 
“formal fairness obscures the systemic concerns that ought to be raised by the fact that the prison 
population is overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately black”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429–38 (1995) (discussing the legitimating function of the 
Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence). 
177. Steiker, supra note 176, at 777 (noting that “the nature and timing of the Supreme Court’s 
intervention” crucially shaped the direction of the American death penalty, which moved attention away 
from “the path of human rights discourse embraced in Europe”); William W. Berry III, American 
Procedural Exceptionalism: A Deterrent or a Catalyst for Death Penalty Abolition?, 17 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 481 (2008) (examining how the capital justice system’s hyper-emphasis on procedure 
impacts death penalty retention in the United States); Jonathan Yehuda, Note, Tinkering with the 
Machinery of Death: Lethal Injection, Procedure, and the Retention of Capital Punishment in the United 
States, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2319 (2013) (describing how the process of lethal injection similarly 
legitimatizes capital punishment). 
178. See supra note 7. 
179. See Desai & Garrett, supra note 164, at 1257 (“[E]mpirical research has just begun to 
examine the question.”). 











consider death penalty retention, surfacing the unacknowledged 
mechanisms and ways of thinking that help to sustain capital punishment.  
C. Implications for Criminal Justice  
Surfacing denialism in the administration of capital punishment naturally 
exposes similar threads in the broader criminal justice system. Before 
explaining what denialism can teach us about the retention of the death 
penalty as a constitutional form of punishment, this section first addresses 
why the implications of this Article’s analysis for the broader criminal 
justice system do not detract from the importance of that inquiry in regard 
to the death penalty.  
The disproportionate impact of race is present in every sphere of the 
criminal justice system180—from the juvenile justice system,181 to municipal 
courts182 and state and federal systems.183 Race plays a role in policing, 
charging, and sentencing decisions, powerfully determines who is arrested 
and prosecuted, and impacts how severely the convicted are penalized, even 
upon release from incarceration.184  
In response, one might reasonably charge that any denialism that exists 
with regard to the legal system’s acceptance of capital punishment cannot 
be confined to that specific problem. In spite of the known problem of racial 
injustice in the enforcement of criminal laws, vast segments of the public 
and legal decision makers still overwhelmingly put their faith in the criminal 
justice system and proceed as if those problems do not exist, are inevitable, 
 
180. See COLE, supra note 176; KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, 
WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS (1998). 
181. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-
Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 405 (1996) (finding 
“clear disadvantages for nonwhites at multiple stages in delinquency case processing” that, while 
varying in effect “from stage to stage,” show “a consistent pattern of unequal treatment”). 
182. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Rigged: When Race and Poverty Determine Outcomes in the 
Criminal Courts, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 263, 270 (2016). Addressing the role of race in Ferguson, 
Missouri’s municipal courts, Bright explained: “Despite making up 67% of the city’s population, blacks 
accounted for 85% of traffic stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests from 2012 to 2014.” Id. He 
noted a 2011 study showing that “black defendants [were] more likely to have their cases persist for 
longer durations, more likely to face a higher number of mandatory court appearances and other 
requirements, and more likely to have a warrant issued against them for failing to meet those 
requirements.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 68 (2015)). 
183. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF 
JUVENILE PRISON (2014); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
BLACK AMERICA (2017). 
184. See supra note 183; see also Roberts, supra note 140, at 262–63 (contending that “racism is 
engrained in the very construction of the system and implicated in its every aspect—how crimes are 
defined, how suspects are identified, how charging decisions are made, how trials are conducted, and 












or simply do not matter.185 As David Cole has noted, the rhetoric and legal 
traditions of the legal system emphasize a formal fairness that permits 
society to ignore these systemic problems.186 
Even with growing bipartisan attention to the issue of criminal justice 
reform, too many legal decision makers and members of the broader public 
still turn a blind eye to the criminal justice system’s most dysfunctional and 
damaging features. One could thus persuasively make the case that 
collective denial about the presence of equal justice in the criminal justice 
system allows the uniquely American phenomenon of mass incarceration to 
continue without drastic and immediate solutions.187 One could surely also 
focus on a number of other specific features of the criminal justice system—
whether juvenile incarceration or solitary confinement—and find evidence 
of societal delusions about the efficacy, purpose, and human costs of each 
practice.188  
The prospect of broader denialism throughout the criminal justice system 
in no way undercuts, however, the value of examining why the death penalty 
as a specific practice and institution may be resistant to abolition 
notwithstanding evidence documenting its serious flaws. As the most 
extreme punishment and form of state power over the individual, capital 
punishment plays a distinct role in illuminating the values and priorities of 
our criminal justice system.189 Moreover, as Anthony Amsterdam put it, the 
death penalty “extends the boundaries of permissible inhumanity so far that 
every lesser offense against humanity seems inoffensive by comparison, 
leading us to tolerate them relatively easily.”190 
Special and initial attention is thus warranted to understand retention of 
the death penalty and how legal decision makers distance themselves from 
 
185. See COLE, supra note 176, at 8–9. 
186. Id. 
187. See ALEXANDER, supra note 183, at 139 (“The Supreme Court has now closed the courthouse 
doors to claims of racial bias at every stage of the criminal justice process, from stops and searches to 
plea bargaining and sentencing.”). 
188. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 972 
(2018) (“Solitary confinement is a practice . . . that uniquely harms people in prisons and jails while 
producing little if any correlative benefit.”). 
189. Others, including Bryan Stevenson, have acknowledged that the problems with the death 
penalty are reflective of broader system-wide failures in the justice system. See Bryan A. Stevenson & 
Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 511 (1994) (“The death penalty is the criminal justice system’s most serious 
and most notorious punishment. How capital punishment is imposed reveals a great deal about the entire 
criminal justice system.” (footnote omitted)). Justice Marshall similarly believed that the death penalty 
had “deleterious effects” throughout the criminal justice system, charging that its “existence ‘inevitably 
sabotages a social or institutional program of reformation.’” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting B. ESHELMAN & F. RILEY, DEATH ROW CHAPLAIN 222 
(1962)). 
190. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 47 (2007). 











its realities through a deliberate unwillingness to acknowledge and respond 
to its severe flaws and human costs. The possibility that reckoning with 
denialism about the death penalty might in turn expose a broader willful 
blindness in the justice system only confirms, rather than undermines, the 
need for the discussion.191 
In this regard, McCleskey v. Kemp,192 the Court’s 1987 decision rejecting 
an equal protection and Eighth Amendment challenge to statistically 
documented racial disparities in Georgia’s capital punishment scheme, is 
instructive. There, the fear that recognizing problems with the death penalty 
would reveal system-wide problems in the criminal justice system193 was 
the sort of denialist-thinking—or “fear of too much justice,” as Justice 
Brennan famously put it—that led the Court to shut its eyes to racial 
injustice.194 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEATH PENALTY’S OPEN SECRETS 
After decades of constitutional regulation, including the Court’s 
temporary abolishment of capital punishment in Furman, the unjust defects 
of America’s death penalty are no longer secrets.195 Rather, the problems 
are transparent. This section utilizes the concept of denialism to examine 
the role of denialism with respect to the Court’s embrace of contested 
narratives about the death penalty,196 its sanctioning of pain-distorting 
 
191. As Bryan Stevenson has argued, the American death penalty undermines the legitimacy of 
the broader criminal justice system. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 78. He argues that it has 
“increasingly come to symbolize a disturbing tolerance for error and injustice that has undermined the 
integrity of criminal justice administration and America’s commitment to human rights.” Id. 
192. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
193. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314–15. In rejecting McCleskey’s Fourteenth and Eighth 
Amendment challenges to Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme based upon racial bias, the Court 
candidly admitted that it was fearful that if McCleskey’s claim that “racial bias has impermissibly tainted 
the capital sentencing decision” were accepted, “similar claims as to other types of penalty” would 
follow. Id. at 315. 
194. Indeed, in rejecting what it acknowledged was statistically valid evidence of racial disparities 
in the administration of Georgia’s death penalty, the Court found such imbalance “an inevitable part of 
our criminal justice system.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. Justice Brennan in dissent aptly labeled this 
reasoning “a fear of too much justice.” Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
195. Nevertheless, many still refer to the problems of the capital punishment system as “secrets” 
rather than acknowledged and accepted features of an unjust system. See Ed Pilkington, Landmark US 
Case to Expose Rampant Racial Bias Behind the Death Penalty, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/24/landmark-us-case-to-expose-rampant-racial-bias-beh 
ind-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/W5J8-92MQ] (noting that a trial in North Carolina under the 
state’s Racial Justice Act would “la[y] bare” “[t]he dark secret of America’s death penalty—the blatant 
and intentional racial bias that infects the system, distorting juries and throwing inordinate numbers of 
African Americans on to death row”). 
196. One example is the notion that the death penalty is reserved for the “worst of the worst.” See 
discussion infra Part III.B; Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(recounting how the Court “sought to make the application of the death penalty less arbitrary by 












execution methods,197 and its decision to allow the documented influence of 
race on the death penalty’s administration to go unanswered.198 These are 
just three areas where denialism in judicial regulation of the death penalty 
surfaces, though there are certainly many others.199  
A. Shielding Racial Bias 
The Supreme Court has declined to meaningfully examine the systemic 
role of race in our capital punishment system200 other than in egregious cases 
where racial animus is apparent on the surface.201 A vast literature has 
criticized the Court’s refusal to act in the face of evidence showing 
overwhelmingly the “death penalty’s racialized history and current 
practice.”202  
On this point, Bryan Stevenson’s voice is the most powerful. He argues 
that America’s current system of capital punishment was shaped by the 
nation’s history of slavery and lynchings and that America is unwilling to 
confront this history and explore its legacy today.203 Stevenson lodges his 
critique at America broadly, but his call to action has specific relevance for 
the Court, given its 1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp.204 In McCleskey, 
the Court rejected an equal protection and Eighth Amendment challenge to 
racial disparities in Georgia’s administration of the death penalty205 in a 
decision that provides a blueprint of denialism about the death penalty. 
 
548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting))); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) 
(“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).  
197. See SARAT, supra note 104, at 67 (“Whereas once the technologies of killing deployed by 
the state were valued precisely because of their gruesome effects on the body of the condemned, today 
we seek a technology that leaves no trace.”); Von Drehle, supra note 1 (quoting Morrison, supra note 9 
(L.A. Times interview with Judge Kozinski)). 
198. See supra Part I.C. 
199. See HANEY, supra note 24, at 213 (discussing avoidance of reality and empirical evidence in 
Court’s regulation of death sentencing by juries). 
200. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 274 (“[T]he Court has a long history of avoiding 
or deflecting the race issue in capital cases, and a sudden change of course does not seem likely.”). 
201. See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (concluding that a condemned prisoner’s 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by introducing expert testimony positing that the 
defendant’s race indicated that he was likely to act violently in the future).  
202. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 110–11 (describing the Court’s avoidance of race in 
death penalty jurisprudence); see also GARLAND, supra note 7, at 12 (addressing undeniable connections 
between the American death penalty and racial violence, in particular lynching); ZIMRING, supra note 
7, at 66 (addressing the link between capital punishment and lynching); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2015). 
203. See Stevenson, supra note 6; We Need to Talk About an Injustice, supra note 102. 
204. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
205. Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of 
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 
1269 (2018). 











The challenge in McCleskey relied upon a validated study by David 
Baldus showing that in Georgia a defendant was more likely to receive a 
death sentence if the victim was white or when the defendant was black.206 
Although the Court accepted the statistical validity of Baldus’s multiple 
regression analysis, it rejected the data as insufficient proof of 
discriminatory purpose in McCleskey’s case. The Court reasoned that such 
data should play no role in assessing the presence of discriminatory purpose 
in death penalty cases because it simply showed a correlation with race and 
not a discriminatory purpose.207 The Court has never since examined “the 
risk of racial bias in capital sentencing or the criminal justice system more 
generally.”208 
On one level, the Court’s refusal to find evidence of racial bias in the 
death penalty’s administration simply reflected the Court’s broader 
approach to examining racial discrimination.209 Indeed, McCleskey is often 
understood simply as an application of the Court’s approach to ascertaining 
discriminatory purpose set forth a decade earlier in Washington v. Davis.210 
Davis’s requirement that litigants show evidence of intentional 
discrimination to establish an equal protection violation has been widely 
criticized in its own right,211 and many have viewed McCleskey as simply a 
demonstration of this same problem.212 
However, as Reva Siegel has argued, McCleskey exhibited a skepticism 
of the type of evidence—statistical proof—presented by McCleskey’s 
lawyers that stood apart from other applications of Davis in the years 
between the two decisions.213 Indeed, Justice Powell found McCleskey’s 
 
206. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. 
207. Id. at 291 n.7. 
208. See Siegel, supra note 205, at 1276. 
209. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1781 (2012) (critiquing 
the Court’s requirement of intent when it “evaluates claims of discrimination against non-Whites”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (2013) (“Judicial interpretation 
responsive to the aggrievement of white citizens threatened to divide equal protection law into two 
bodies of doctrine: one body of law governing minority complaints that was deferential to democratic 
actors, and another body of law responsive to majority complaints that closely scrutinized democratic 
decisionmaking.”).  
210. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Siegel, supra note 205, at 1277. Siegel notes that “[t]he standard 
story points to the Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis barring disparate impact claims in 
constitutional cases as shielding the operations of the criminal justice system from equal protection 
challenge.” Id. But as Siegel notes, while much “work is performed by subsequent cases that restrict 
how discriminatory purpose can be proved,” id., the Court’s approach in McCleskey was not entirely 
faithful to the approach it purported to apply, since the statistical evidence presented by McCleskey’s 
lawyers certainly gave rise to an inference of intentional discrimination in light of the Court’s intervening 
decisions and the standards set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
211. See Haney-López, supra note 209, at 1806–08, 1812–14; Siegel, supra note 209, at 47. 














reliance “solely on statistical evidence to prove discriminatory purpose in 
his case” troubling and “expressed wide-ranging skepticism about the use 
of statistical evidence to prove discriminatory purpose in any equal 
protection challenge in a criminal case.”214  
This hostility to empirical evidence of race-motivated decision making 
is striking given the Court’s willingness to consider empirically-backed 
evidence of discriminatory purpose in Title VII cases and with respect to 
group representation in grand jury selection.215 The Court attempted to 
justify this different approach by emphasizing the discretion that necessarily 
surrounds decision making in the criminal justice system.216 The Court 
deemed it problematic that McCleskey challenged “discretionary 
judgements” “at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system.”217 Noting 
that “discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,” the Court 
refused to make any inferences about motive based upon statistics, 
demanding “exceptionally clear proof” of bias or abuse of discretion.218 
Likewise, the Court refused to attribute discriminatory motives to the 
State for its decision to adopt and keep the capital punishment statute on the 
books irrespective of its discriminatory application.219 To show purposeful 
discrimination, the Court said McCleskey would have to “prove that the 
Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because 
of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”220 Given the Legislature’s 
legitimate reasons for enacting criminal laws and penalties, its wide 
discretion in doing so, and the absence of evidence, in the Court’s view, of 
 
214. Id. at 1275 & n.41 (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must 
prove that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no evidence 
specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his 
sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the Baldus study.” (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
292–93 (1987))).  
215. The Court acknowledged that it had accepted multiple regression statistical analysis in 
evaluating Title VII and grand jury venire cases but unpersuasively endeavored to distinguish those 
contexts. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294–95. Specifically, the Court posited that the use of statistics in those 
other contexts “relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions.” Id. 
at 295 (footnotes omitted). The Court also expressed concern that unlike in those contexts, where “the 
decision maker has an opportunity to explain the statistical disparity,” in the case of racial disparities in 
capital sentencing, the State would have “no practical opportunity to rebut the Baldus study.” Id. at 296.  
216. Id. at 296 (noting prosecutors’ “traditionally ‘wide discretion’” (quoting Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))). Finding legitimate, neutral grounds for seeking the death penalty in 
McCleskey’s case—his commission of the crime—the Court refused to require the State to defend its 
decision to seek the death penalty, noting that such challenges would often occur “years after” such 
decisions were made. Id. at 296–97 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425–26 (1976)). 
217. Id. at 297. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 298.  
220. Id. Indeed, according to the Court, “[d]iscriminatory purpose” requires that a legislature 
adopt the law “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 (1979)).  











another improper legislative purpose, the Court declined to infer that 
Georgia had a discriminatory purpose in adopting the capital punishment 
scheme.221  
The Court also concluded that McCleskey’s sentence was not 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that he 
was sentenced pursuant to Georgia law that properly focused discretion “on 
the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics 
of the individual defendant.” 222 
But the real clue to the Court’s unwillingness to respond to racial 
disparities in McCleskey is evident from the “[t]wo additional concerns” it 
cited outside of its primary Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment analysis.223 
First, the Court admitted that it was fearful that McCleskey’s claims, if 
accepted, would throw into question whether “racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted . . . other types of penalt[ies]” throughout the “entire criminal justice 
system.”224 The Court worried specifically that ruling for McCleskey would 
lead to claims based upon other protected statuses, “even” including 
gender.225 Citing absurd examples of arbitrariness that could conceivably be 
statistically proven, like disparities based upon facial characteristics of the 
defendant, the Court claimed that there would be “no limiting principle to 
the type of challenge” brought under the Eighth Amendment were the Court 
to rule for McCleskey.226  
In doing so, the Court suggested that disparities based upon race are 
equivalent to disparities based upon any irrelevant factor, even those that do 
not garner a constitutional guarantee of equal treatment.227 Summing up, it 
reasoned that the Constitution does not “plac[e] totally unrealistic 
conditions” on the use of capital punishment—but the Court never justified 
why insistence on a system free of racial bias should be considered 
“unrealistic.”228 The Court essentially threw up its hands at the prospect of 
 
221. Id. at 298–99. 
222. Id. at 308 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 207 (1976)) (reasoning that 
McCleskey’s death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed and thus not “disproportionate 
within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment”). 
223. Id. at 314. 
224. Id. at 314–15. 
225. Id. at 316–318 (dreading that if the Court focused on whether the punishment were “arbitrary 
and capricious” under the Eighth Amendment, then it would have to consider whether any “any arbitrary 
variable, such as the defendant’s facial characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or 
the victim, that some statistical study indicates may be influential in jury decisionmaking” were also 
arbitrary and capricious under the Eighth Amendment (footnotes omitted)).  
226. Id. at 318–19. 
227. Id. (“The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that 
correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes 
capital punishment.”). 












eradicating racial bias from the legal system, while also emphasizing that it 
was no different than disparities based upon non-protected characteristics.  
The second giveaway that denialist thinking influenced McCleskey was 
its conclusion that such “arguments are best presented to the legislative 
bodies.”229 Even while acknowledging that “[i]t is the ultimate duty of 
courts to determine on a case-by-case basis” whether laws, including capital 
sentencing laws, “are applied consistently with the Constitution,” and 
notwithstanding that McCleskey did not challenge the constitutionality of 
the death penalty in the abstract, only whether it was administered in a way 
that violated the Constitution, the Court minimized its role and its 
responsibility for correcting racial injustice.230 Noting that it lacked 
“responsibility—or indeed even the right . . . to determine the appropriate 
punishment for particular crimes,”231 the Court directed the question back 
to the legislature. But a request to reimagine appropriate punishments for 
crimes was not part of McCleskey’s case. The question—whether the 
Constitution prohibits death sentences from being determined in part by 
race— was one uniquely for the courts. 
The Court added to this disavowal of judicial responsibility its doubts 
about courts’ institutional competence “to weigh and ‘evaluate the results 
of statistical studies,’” positing that legisaltures are better able than the 
courts to flexibly assess such information “in terms of their own local 
conditions.”232 Finally, the Court suggested a resigned view of 
discrimination as inevitable, rejecting McCleskey’s claim as an untenable 
challenge to “the validity of capital punishment in our multiracial 
society.”233 
A closer reading of these parts of the McCleskey decision contradicts any 
suggestion that the Court merely rejected contested evidence, or even 
espoused some broader hostility to empiricism informing constitutional 
decision making.234 Instead, the decision is consonant with what Stephen 
Bright has described as courts’ “state of denial.”235 That is, “instead of 
 
229. Id. at 319. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. (“It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are ‘constituted to 
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.’” (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))). 
232. Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).  
233. Id.  
234. Writing for the Court in Glossip, Justice Alito reaffirmed the Court’s statement in Baze that 
the “federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their 
expertise.’” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2740 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 
553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008)). 
235. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 469 (1995) (“Despite 
the racial discrimination which has been a major aspect of the death penalty throughout American 
history, the Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts have been reluctant to face racial issues 











confronting and dealing with the difficult and sensitive issue of race,”236 
McCleskey showcases a Court deflecting responsibility for racial injustice 
to others while at the same time minimizing the existence of racial 
disparities as both inevitable and equivalent to other disparities based upon 
non-protected characteristics. The decision thus lays bare many of the 
hallmarks of denial. 
Specifically, the Court used doubts about institutional competence and 
vague, unnecessary notions of judicial restraint as shields to openly spare 
the Court from grappling with a profound failing of the legal system.237 
That, in turn, allowed the Court to continue to avoid difficult questions 
about the justices’ own role in state killing, and its responsibility for, and 
proximity to, profound racial injustice.238 This has provided separation 
between the Court, along with the supposedly neutral, fair legal processes it 
upholds, and any racial disparity that it characterizes as beyond judicial 
supervision.239 The potential discriminatory application of capital laws are 
euphemistically recast as discretion and the need for judicial restraint 
exaggerated.240   
B. The Fallacy of “the Worst” 
A second area of death penalty regulation where denialism thrives is with 
respect to the Court’s embrace of the empirically tenuous claim that the 
death penalty is reserved for the “worst of the worst.”241 The Court has 
described this in terms of the seriousness of the crime and also which 
offenders are most “deserving of execution.”242 But in reality, a wide body 
of evidence, much of it produced in part through judicial regulation of 
capital punishment, makes plain that capital punishment is plagued by racial 
 
presented by capital cases.”). 
236. Id.  
237. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
238. HANEY, supra note 24, at 160–61 (describing how the system of juror sentencing encourages 
a similar moral disengagement by jurors that permits them to distance themselves from the reality of 
their role in state killing).  
239. See COVER, supra note 75, at 5–6 (describing how the judiciary that enforced fugitive slave 
laws “paraded its helplessness before the law”). 
240. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 8 (describing implicatory denial as minimization and 
disclaiming of responsibility: “‘[these killings have] nothing to do with me’, ‘[w]hy should I take a risk 
of [intervening]’”).  
241. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting how 
the Court “sought to make the application of the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its use to those 
whom Justice Souter called ‘the worst of the worst’” (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 
(2006) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
242. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited to 
those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme 
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 












and geographic disparities, and that those who end up on death row do not 
necessarily reflect the most dangerous, but the most damaged.  
Indeed, beyond racial disparities in death sentences, the condemned are 
also likely to be poor,243 to be survivors of “nightmarish” childhoods,244 and 
a striking number are intellectually disabled.245 Though these characteristics 
are not inconsistent with committing horrific crimes, it complicates the 
Court’s unbending commitment to the “worst of the worst” story, which has 
come to symbolize the entire constitutional justification for capital 
punishment post-Furman and Gregg. An irony of the Court’s constitutional 
regulation of the death penalty since those decisions is the exposure through 
judicial decision making of a common counter-factual that challenges the 
Court’s prevailing “worst of the worst” narrative.246  
Indeed, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in Atkins v. 
Virginia,247 which declared the execution of persons with intellectual 
disabilities a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and Roper v. Simmons,248 
which declared the execution of juveniles a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, itself undermines the idea that the modern death penalty has 
only singled out the “worst of the worst.” Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted 
in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, empirical evidence suggests that whether 
death sentences are imposed depends less on the “egregiousness” of the 
crimes, and more on “arbitrary” factors, including the location where the 
crime was committed.249 This evidence, which Justice Thomas dismissed as 
“empirical studies performed by death penalty abolitionists,”250 illustrates 
 
243. See Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: 
International Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 WIS. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (“Throughout history, the death penalty has been reserved almost exclusively for those 
who are poor.”). 
244. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000), the Court found trial counsel ineffective for 
failing to investigate evidence of Williams’s “nightmarish” childhood, which included physical abuse 
and neglect, dislocation, and his intellectual disability. Yet, these factors in Williams’s life are not unique 
to his case. Indeed, psychologists and other experts consider them to be forensic risk factors for 
susceptibility to criminal behavior without therapeutic interventions and social support, and the Supreme 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence is full of decisions recounting the similar early lives of other 
condemned men.  
245. List of Defendants with Intellectual Disability Executed in the United States (1976–2002), 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/list-of-defendants-with-mental-retard 
ation-executed-in-the-united-states-1976-2002 [https://perma.cc/DZ2Z-QMX3]. 
246. See SARAT, supra note 104, at 14 (arguing that the death penalty deflects attention away from 
the root causes and societal responsibility for “heinous acts of violence”). 
247. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
248. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
249. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Such studies 
indicate that the factors that most clearly ought to affect application of the death penalty—namely, 
comparative egregiousness of the crime—often do not. Other studies show that circumstances that ought 
not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race, gender, or geography, often do.”). 
250. Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., concurring). 











how the Court has willingly embraced dominant, yet empirically contested, 
narratives about the death penalty within its judicial decisions.251  
This commitment to narrative again exhibits elements of denial. The 
notion that those accused, convicted, and sentenced to die are the “worst of 
the worst” serves to mask the reality of state killing. To be sure, many 
persons convicted of capital crimes have committed heinous crimes. But as 
noted above, the reality of who is sentenced to die and actually executed is 
far more varied and troublesome. It is only by reliance upon the “worst of 
the worst” frame that legal decision makers can justify their roles in the 
system of state killing. And thus, the narrative, even if untrue, hides and 
distorts the ugliness of incomprehensible harm, reinventing events into a 
more comfortable and sustainable version of reality. 
C. Judging Cruelty 
The United States’ current approach to methods of execution has 
permitted the public and legal decision makers a level of moral detachment 
that would be less sustainable if the reality of state killing were more widely 
apparent.252 Some of the customary tools of denialism, secrecy and state 
distortion,253 facilitate this detachment by helping to render imperceptible 
the reality of state killing.  
Other features of denialism are built into the current execution method-
of-choice: lethal injection. Specifically, the second lethal injection drug 
used in many states’ three-drug protocols is a paralytic, which functions to 
conceal condemned prisoners’ experience of painful deaths.254 As the 
 
251. Indeed, the Court’s opinions continue to adhere to the assumption that the death penalty is 
administered only to the “worst of the worst” notwithstanding that the answer to that question is 
empirically knowable. See supra note 8. 
252. See Editorial, The Humane Death Penalty Charade, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/opinion/the-humane-death-penalty-charade.html [https://perma.c 
c/NGQ3-76CS]. 
253. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 145 (noting that “[e]ven the most repressive and closed regime 
cannot achieve total secrecy or information control”). Cohen explains that when a “culture[] of denial . . . 
permeate[s] a whole society” denial occurs through “direct state coercion, subtle encouragement or self-
imposed concern with your country’s image.” Id. Cohen describes how governments’ control of 
narrative and visual representations facilitates a culture of denial as occurred with the sanitized 
presentation of the Gulf War’s “collateral damage” and digital images of “smart bombs.” Id. at 280–85. 
254. The first drug is supposed to render a person unconscious, while the second drug paralyzes a 
person, and the third triggers cardiac arrest, causing a burning, excruciating pain, which Justice 
Sotomayor described in her dissent in Glossip as “the chemical equivalent of being burned at the stake.” 
135 S. Ct. at 2781 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Cruel and Unusual, MORE PERFECT (June 2, 
2016), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolabmoreperfect/episodes/cruel-and-unusual [https:// 
perma.cc/3UHJ-QBDW] (describing Maya Foa, Director of Reprieve’s death penalty comments about 
the function and purpose of the second drug in many states’ three-drug lethal injection protocols: 












former chief judge of the Ninth Circuit recently suggested, lethal injection 
drugs work as a “mask.”255 
Indeed, the Defendant in Baze v. Rees,256 a challenge to Kentucky’s use 
of a three-drug lethal injection protocol, claimed that the state’s use of the 
second drug in the protocol, pancuronium bromide, “serve[d] no therapeutic 
purpose while suppressing muscle movements that could reveal an 
inadequate administration of the first drug.”257 But Justice Roberts, writing 
for a plurality of the Court, suggested some value in obscuring the physical 
impact of lethal injection. He described the “prevent[ion of] involuntary 
physical movements” as justified under the Eighth Amendment because it 
“preserv[es] the dignity of the procedure, especially where convulsions or 
seizures could be misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.”258  
This was an odd, arguably unparalleled,259 invocation of dignity in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Justice Roberts emphasized the dignity of the 
procedure as the relevant focus, as opposed to the dignity of the prisoner 
(though arguably believing the former provided dignity to the dying 
prisoner as well).260 This rationale echoes of denialism: judges who cannot 
know of a potentially painful death are no longer implicated in failing to 
stop it. Indeed, as Stanley Cohen has stated, “[w]e didn’t know,” or “[w]e 
didn’t see anything,” are familiar expressions of individual or collective 
denial in the aftermath of collective violence.261  
Additional features of denialism were evident in the Court’s 2015 
decision in Glossip v. Gross.262 There, the Court’s approach to lethal 
injection adopted an unusual rule for assessing the risk of severe pain 
experienced by condemned prisoners. Specifically, the Court held that a 
State’s method of execution may be constitutional even if it creates a 
substantial risk of severe pain, so long as an alternative less painful measure 
is not readily identified by the condemned prisoner at the time of a 
challenge.263 Indeed, the Court read its decision in Baze to require the 
prisoner himself to identify a less-painful method of execution in order to 
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U.S. 467). 
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succeed in an Eighth Amendment challenge to a specific execution 
method.264 The Court explained that “prisoners ‘cannot successfully 
challenge a State’s method of execution merely by showing a slightly or 
marginally safer alternative[;]’ [i]nstead, prisoners must identify an 
alternative that is ‘feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly 
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.’”265  
This analysis ignored that, as a practical matter, foregoing an execution 
until it can be accomplished without a “substantial risk of severe pain” is 
necessarily always an option available to the State. In placing the burden on 
the prisoner challenging the State’s execution method, the Court reasoned 
that “because it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional, ‘[i]t 
necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying 
it out.’”266 While this was not the first time the Court has stated this 
syllogism, in Glossip the Court relied upon it in a new way. It reasoned that 
because the death penalty is constitutional, the execution method in question 
had to be constitutional because the challenger did not identify a less painful 
alternative. As Justice Sotomayor suggested in her dissent, simply because 
the State possesses authority, does not justify “any and all means” to 
exercise it.267  
In this regard, Glossip reflects an unusual form of willful blindness about 
the death penalty. The Court was unwilling to acknowledge state 
responsibility for the methods and pain caused during executions, 
transferring responsibility and arguably blame for such harm to condemned 
prisoners.268 Scholars have criticized Glossip’s addition of “a requirement 
that offenders find an alternative method of execution before any specific 
Eighth Amendment challenge to an execution method can succeed [as] a 
corruption of Eighth Amendment doctrine, lacking a sound basis in 
constitutional thought.”269 Denialism again provides a helpful lens to 
understand this unusual doctrinal requirement. 
Specifically, blaming challengers for failing to identify execution 
methods consistent with the Eighth Amendment distances the decision 
maker from complicity in acts alleged to amount to torture.270 It also treats 
the presumed justness of the death penalty as dispositive in Eighth 
Amendment challenges to particular executions no matter the harm 
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caused.271 This also echoes the rhetoric used to disclaim state responsibility 
for violence in other settings: the justness of the State’s cause and 
motivation means it cannot be blamed for its own violence.  
D. Dignity and Death 
Ultimately, the role of the courts in America’s system of capital 
punishment reflects a seminal contradiction. In its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence,272 including in the capital context,273 as well as when 
interpreting individual rights,274 the Supreme Court has increasingly 
recognized and enforced constitutional commitments to human dignity.275 
At the same time, within its constitutional regulation of the death penalty 
and specifically when exercising the final say on whether condemned 
prisoners’ executions may imminently proceed, the Court occupies a 
proximate and decisive space in the process of state killing. This latter 
feature of capital punishment in the United States is a significant, but 
underappreciated dimension of American exceptionalism with respect to the 
persistence of the death penalty. 
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274. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (recognizing that Due Process liberties 
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275. See generally Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383 
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The Court’s controversial order in Dunn v. Ray276 is a powerful and 
recent illustration. In a 5–4 split, the Court vacated a stay of execution 
granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit277 
after a condemned Muslim prisoner challenged on Establishment Clause 
grounds Alabama’s refusal to allow an Imam to be present with him during 
his execution.278 The Supreme Court’s brief order reversing the Court of 
Appeals’ stay cleared the way for Ray’s immediate execution without any 
religious advisor present.279  
Given the religious context, factual disputes about whether Ray had 
acted expeditiously in bringing the claim, and the fact that the Court of 
Appeals wanted more time to explore the First Amendment claim, the 
Court’s decision to intervene appears as a particularly unnecessary affront 
to human dignity.280 That is particularly true because the case involved not 
a broad-based challenge to a prisoner’s sentence that could be extended in 
litigation seemingly indefinitely, but a far more limited but substantial 
question related to the circumstances of the execution. The Court’s 
intervention—which was purportedly based upon a narrow technical ruling 
regarding exhaustion—was easily avoidable. The Court’s easy disregard for 
condemned prisoners’ dignity at the moment of death by denying religious 
counsel to all but Christians seemed to signal in a cruel and specific way 
that dignity matters little to the Court when it comes to the death penalty.  
The Court’s decision to vacate the stay in Ray makes visible the deep 
tension that exists when an institution arguably charged with protecting 
human dignity281 simultaneously closely regulates the process of state 
killing.282 The weighty and important interest sacrificed, a person’s spiritual 
 
276. 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019). 
277. Ray v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 915 F.3d 689, 695 (11th Cir. 2019).  
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Establishment Clause” claim after prison officials claimed that only the prison’s Christian minister had 
security clearance to be present during executions).  
279. Ray, 139 S. Ct. at 661. Asserting that Ray waited too long to seek relief, the Court rejected 
the position of Justice Kagan and the dissenters that Ray was informed only two weeks before his 
execution that the prison would exclude his Iman from the execution chamber. Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). Justice Kagan noted that “the relevant statute would not have placed Ray on notice” any 
earlier “that the prison would deny his request.” Id. 
280. The Court chose to intervene and remove the stay notwithstanding the appearance of 
judicially-sanctioned Christian preferentialism that hung over the dispute. Justice Kagan and three 
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majority’s decision profoundly wrong and “against the Establishment Clause’s core principle of 
denominational neutrality”); see also Editorial, Is Religious Freedom for Christians Only?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/opinion/supreme-court-alabama-execution.html 
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281. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
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resources at death, exposes the weakness of the Court’s procedural 
justification for its ruling: that the prisoner failed to timely challenge such 
restriction.283 
The deep tension that exists when courts play a proximate role in state 
killing is evident in lower court decisions as well. Take, for example, the 
emergency judicial hearing during the 2014 execution of Joseph Wood. The 
hearing resembled a routine judicial conference in which a federal judge, 
applying Eighth Amendment law, assessed competing narratives and 
proffers. But the choice before the court—ordering procedures to save a 
man’s life or allowing the State to “push” additional chemicals to hasten his 
death—highlighted in a way rarely so visible284 the contradictions of a legal 
system that aspires to value human dignity,285 while simultaneously 
enforcing constitutional rules that normalize state killing.286  
The emergency conference occurred by telephone ninety minutes into 
Wood’s execution after his public defender filed a motion for an emergency 
stay, citing Wood’s “gasping” and “snorting” and that he was “not 
dying.”287 She moved for an order directing the Department of Corrections 
pursuant to Arizona’s lethal injection protocol to begin medical procedures 
to save Wood’s life.288  
The Assistant Attorney General for Arizona responded with what might 
be aptly described under Cohen’s terms as interpretative denial: the activity 
 
theoretical tension with the legal system’s commitment to “decency and restraint”). 
283. See Will Baude, The Execution of Domineque Ray, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 8, 2019, 
12:25 AM), https://reason.com/2019/02/08/the-execution-of-domineque-ray/ [https://perma.cc/VX6P-
M59L] (expressing concern that the Court’s “conclusion seemed to rest on the questionable application 
of a technicality, with extremely high stakes”). 
284. Of course, courts routinely make life and death decisions in capital cases, albeit at various 
degrees of separation from executions.  
285. In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Stewart wrote that the death penalty 
is an “absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.” 408 U.S. 238, 306 
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in the same case, questioned 
“whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can, without a 
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ultimately concluding that capital punishment was “uniquely degrading to human dignity.” Id. at 291, 
296 (Brennan, J., concurring). Since Furman, there has been a “striking shift” in discourse about capital 
punishment with a “virtual disappearance” of arguments premised upon the death penalty’s “denial of 
human dignity.” STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 246–47 (explaining that today opponents largely 
ground their arguments in the death penalty’s “arbitrariness and discrimination” or highlight new 
problems “like delays between sentence and execution” and the availability of execution drugs); Steiker, 
supra note 176, at 781–82 (noting that arguments that the death penalty “violates a fundamental human 
right (to life or dignity) are virtually absent” from the death penalty debate in the United States, including 
within successful abolitionist movements in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois). 
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cv-14-1447-PHS-NVW (D. Ariz. July 23, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2014/j 
ul/24/arizona-joseph-wood-exeuction-court-hearing-transcript [https://perma.cc/E873-6NWM] 
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Wood’s lawyer described was indeed happening, but the physical signs 
were not consistent with a belabored, painful death.289 According to the 
State, Mr. Wood’s gasping was an involuntary “snoring-type” reaction; he 
was unconscious.290  
Lamenting the difficulty of determining for Eighth Amendment purposes 
whether Wood faced a risk of pain should the execution continue, the 
district judge questioned whether reversing course and “suspending the 
execution” would “do more harm than good.”291 Thirty minutes into the call 
and before the judge could resolve the dispute, the State reported that Mr. 
Wood was dead.292  
On one view, Wood’s hearing was not so unusual. It merely reflected 
judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, albeit in exigent 
circumstances. After all, the district court was merely overseeing 
enforcement of laws duly enacted by the people of Arizona. Yet, that 
explanation inadequately captures the proximate role of the courts in the 
process of state killing made powerfully visible in Wood’s hearing. Indeed, 
a seemingly routine ritual of judicial process arbitrated the fate of a man 
teetering between life and death. The juxtaposition is at once jarring and 
illuminating. It forces the question of how an institution that recognizes and 
is arguably charged with protecting human dignity,293 simultaneously can 
closely regulate the process of state killing. This Article argues that 
denialism plays a role in this strange duality.  
 Scholars, death penalty opponents, including the Catholic Church, and 
individual jurists have all contended that capital punishment is incompatible 
with the value of human dignity.294 But these critiques rarely explore the 
complex, dignity-erasing function attributable to the Court itself through its 
constitutional regulation of state killing.295 To break free of denialism in the 
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290. TR, supra note 287, at 7. Based upon the observations of state medical officials on site, the 
State further claimed that Mr. Wood’s condition was “the type of reaction that one gets if they were 
taken off of life support.” Id. at 8. “The brain stem is working but there’s no brain activity.” Id. 
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constitutional regulation of the death penalty, this dimension of death 
penalty retention must be directly considered, not avoided.  
IV. CONFRONTING DENIALISM THROUGH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT  
The concept of denialism offers another way to understand America’s 
retention of the death penalty and ultimately to better engage with questions 
about the purposes it serves, and whether it can be sustained in a 
constitutional system committed to human dignity, of which the Eighth 
Amendment is a critical part. Indeed, confronting and responding to hard 
truths about the death penalty is necessary to advance “the fundamental 
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.”296  
In a series of dissents,297 Justice Breyer has led the charge to expose the 
“fundamental constitutional defects” in the death penalty that a majority of 
the Court and public have largely declined to acknowledge.298 For example, 
in his dissent in Glossip, a case challenging Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol, Justice Breyer charged that capital punishment is likely 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment separate and apart from the 
legality of the specific methods chosen to carry it out.299 He pointed to the 
death penalty’s unreliability, arbitrariness, and “unconscionably long 
delays” that undermine capital punishment’s penological purposes.300  
Since Glossip, Justice Breyer has continued to dissent when the Court 
has declined to stay or review condemned prisoners’ cases.301 In doing so, 
he has cited the role of race in the death penalty’s implementation and the 
cruel and unusual nature of excessively long delays in execution while many 
condemned prisoners are subjected to prolonged solitary confinement.302  
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297. Boyer v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 1446, 1447 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); Conner v. Sellers, 136 S. Ct. 2441 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial 
of certiorari and denial of stay); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of stay); Knight 
v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
298. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
299. See supra note 20. 
300. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
301. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have also issued vigorous dissents in denial of stays in capital 
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for 40 years”). Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sireci also took issue with the Court’s denial of certiorari in 
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Justice Breyer’s sustained attack on the death penalty breaks from the 
Court’s typical refusal to talk honestly about capital punishment since the 
Court invalidated the death penalty for a short four-year period in Furman 
v. Georgia.303 But for this critique to have broader influence requires a 
candid confrontation with denialism itself. This is no small task given the 
layers of denial—on the part of citizens, legislators, and the judiciary—that 
sustain capital punishment in the United States.304 Yet, there are several 
entry points for confronting denialism through Eighth Amendment analysis.  
 Confronting denialism would at the very least accomplish the following: 
(1) it would treat the impact of race on the death penalty as unfinished 
business never resolved by McCleskey and the assurance of race-neutral 
administration of the criminal law as a constitutional imperative not just 
under the Fourteenth Amendment but as an “evolving standard of decency” 
under the Eighth Amendment; (2) it would scuttle prevailing narratives 
about how the death penalty works and test those propositions with proof; 
and (3) it would prompt the Court to be suspicious of methods and 
arguments that shield it and the public from the reality of state killing. These 
principles could be put into action through the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
“evolving standards of decency” doctrine. 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment” plays two related roles with respect to the regulation of 
criminal sentences.305 One strand of Eighth Amendment doctrine imposes a 
proportionality principle that prohibits criminal punishments that are 
excessive in relation to the crime.306 A lack of proportionality may be found 
notwithstanding any showing that a specific form of punishment is cruel in 
and of itself.307  
 
[he] would consider especially cruel and unusual circumstances.” Id. Justice Breyer would have heard a 
claim by Romell Broom that Ohio’s attempt to execute him by lethal injection a second time after a first 
botched execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 471. He also would have heard 
the case of Ronald B. Smith, a case in which the Court denied a stay of execution to an Alabama man 
who was sentenced to death after a trial judge overrode a jury’s recommendation of a life sentence, at a 
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The second strand of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires that 
punishments not violate “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”308 The Court has relied upon this strand of 
Eighth Amendment doctrine to find the death penalty unconstitutional as 
applied to specific crimes and categories of offenders.309 
Within that second category of Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court 
considers two components relevant to the nation’s “evolving standards of 
decency.” First, the infrequency of a punishment’s imposition can suggest 
that society has relinquished support for particular punishments.310 Second, 
if the death penalty’s use no longer serves valid penological ends, it violates 
evolving standards of decency.311  
Eradicating from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence the characteristics of 
denial described in this Article could further an “evolving standards of 
decency” analysis. First, as LDF argued in McCleskey, unequal imposition 
of the death penalty based upon a defendant’s or victim’s race cannot 
possibly further a just penological goal of the criminal justice system.  
The McCleskey Court did not disagree with this proposition, but instead 
rejected the notion that race actually determined capital sentencing 
decisions in Georgia, imposing the “discriminatory purpose” requirement 
of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. But a Court committed to the 
principle that race cannot be a relevant factor in the administration of the 
criminal law could not rest after acknowledging statistically valid evidence 
of racial disparities. A Court committed to enforcing racial equality as a 
“standard of decency” would invite briefing and further challenges to 
examine how race determines outcomes in the context of capital punishment 
and consider evidence-based proof of discrimination consistent with its own 
doctrines.  
Similarly, a Court committed to a jurisprudence free of reflexive 
denialism about the death penalty would jettison narratives suggesting that 
the death penalty is reserved for the “worst of the worst” when saying so 
only serves to further encase the death penalty within a shell of unexamined 
legitimacy, without first establishing that this Eighth Amendment 
shibboleth is actually true. That would require examination of racial and 
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geographic arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty urged by 
Justice Breyer.312  
Finally, a Court seeking to rid its jurisprudence of denialist tendencies 
would be particularly suspicious of methods and arguments that shield the 
Court and the public from the realities of state killing. As a practical matter, 
this would mean heightened skepticism of lethal injection protocols that 
make it harder to perceive a prisoner’s pain and abandoning doctrines that 
make the “cruelty” of one execution method turn on whether a condemned 
prisoner can identify a less harmful alternative. Doing so would provide 
assurance that the Court has not immunized itself from assessing the actual 
“cruelty” of the penalties it upholds. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of denialism described in this Article illuminates patterns in 
judicial regulation of the death penalty that facilitate uncritical acceptance 
of capital punishment as a constitutional form of punishment. Removing 
denialism will not alone produce a more just Eighth Amendment analysis, 
but that does not excuse reliance upon it as a justification for willful 
blindness. Ultimately, acknowledging and naming denialism can help clear 
the space within our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for a more rigorous 
and honest confrontation with hard truths about the death penalty. Doing so 
inevitably provokes further exploration of a proposition only surfaced in 
this Article, but which deserves further attention: whether judicial 
regulation of capital punishment is compatible with a legal system that 
purports to value human dignity and charges the judiciary with protecting 
those values under the Constitution. 
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